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Abstract 
PSYCHIC COLLAPSE AND TRAUMATIC DEFENSE: 
HOW THE MIND MEDIATES TRAUMA LIVING IN THE BODY 
 
by 
 
Patricia Kim Yoon 
 
 
Advisor: Denise Hien, Ph.D. 
The aim of this exploratory study was to link psychoanalytic theories of trauma and its 
impact on the mind with psychobiological research of how trauma lives in the body. The study 
has expanded on prior research (Cramer, 2003) to evidence that defense mechanisms do in fact 
moderate the relationship between stress and physiological response, and that there are likely 
individual differences in physiological response to traumatic stress. This study goes further to 
identify the psychological concomitants of these individual differences within an adult 
population exposed to potentially traumatic events (PTEs), and their proclivity for using different 
defense mechanisms. Defense use was measured simultaneously with autonomic reactivity 
during a stress-response task for adults with no onset of PTEs (n=14), early onset of PTEs 
(n=14), and late onset of PTEs (n=15). Findings suggest that there may be distinct, dissociative-
like processes that differentiate the use of Projection and Identification for individuals who 
endorse early onset of PTEs. 
Results: Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that symptomatic adults who had been 
exposed to PTEs prior to age 14 (early onset), and who tended to use Projection as their main 
defense (over Denial and Identification), demonstrated significantly lower physiological arousal 
than adults with late onset of PTEs. Those with early onset PTEs that used Identification as their 
main defense, evidenced higher physiological arousal. These findings support the idea that 
 v 
working with trauma populations warrants careful attention to patients’ often variable, subjective 
experiences of stress, their own active/passive coping strategies, as well as baseline physiological 
reactivity, as potentially impacted by early exposure to PTEs. Altogether, this study further 
evidenced the multi-determined nature of posttraumatic response. Early exposure to PTEs may 
recalibrate defense use and bodily stress response systems, and thus must be viewed within a 
developmental psychopathology framework. 
Keywords: posttraumatic stress disorder, complex trauma, skin conductance, defense 
mechanisms, TAT, dissociation 
  
 vi 
Acknowledgements 
 
I want to thank my advisor and dissertation chair, Denise Hien, for her enduring support and 
unwavering humanity through this long, transformative journey. I feel extraordinarily fortunate 
to have had her mentorship, wisdom and always grounding perspective while she provided 
constant inspiration as a guiding force from day one, and consistently through to the end. Her 
positive impact on my graduate career and identity as a psychologist is immeasurable. I want to 
thank Steve Tuber, whose unparalleled exuberance and rare gift for teaching crucially informed 
and inspired my own clinical passions. I am eternally grateful for his abiding faith and support, 
and for steadily nurturing the development of my own voice, and knowing that it’s precisely 
what I needed. I also want to thank my committee members and readers, Bob Melara, Lesia 
Ruglass, and Eric Fertuck, who contributed to rekindling and expanding my research interests; 
each in their own way modeling thoughtful, generative, exciting discussions that helped shape 
and challenge my thinking. It was an honor and pleasure to work alongside them. Not least, I 
want to thank my exceptional fellow colleagues in training – the collective talent, warmth, 
inspiration, solace, humor and unconditional respect that comprised the home base of learning, 
from which I know has made me a better, more well-adjusted clinician. A special thanks to 
Kahlila R. and Laurie S. for their thoughtful contributions and dedicated hours of reliability 
training with the DMM and especially to Santiago Papini, whose unwavering faith and 
inextinguishable curiosity for learning astounded me, all the while gifting me with invaluable 
and desperately needed statistical support. Finally, I want to thank my exceptional friends and 
family whose tireless support, patience, and love I most certainly could not have traveled this far 
without. My deepest gratitude to Ben, who waited out the long days, weathered the storms, and 
remained always willing to put his selfless, gigantic faith and love into this journey with me; 
 vii 
always challenging me to consider what I desired. I could not be standing here without him by 
my side. And to my parents, Kim Seung Ae and Yoon Dong Jin, who taught me a few things 
about working hard and how sweetly it can pay off. I dedicate this dissertation to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of Figures   x 
    
List of Tables   xi 
 
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION    
 
 Introduction   1 
 
 Synopsis of Literature Review   2 
  
CHAPTER 2 : REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE      
 
Defining Trauma – A Brief History       5 
 
Psychoanalytic Theories of Trauma       7 
 
Defining Defenses – An Ego Psychology Perspective    12 
 
Contemporary Research on Defense Mechanisms     16 
 
Developmental Model of Defense, The DMM     19 
 
Impact of Trauma         22 
 
Psychobiological Impact        23 
 
On Cognition          26 
 
The Present Study: A Paradigm to Study Defense Use and     27 
Physiological Reactivity        
 
Study Hypotheses         30 
          
CHAPTER 3: METHODS        
 
Sample          33 
 
Procedures          34 
 
Measures          34 
 
Plan for Data Analysis         37 
  
 
 
 ix 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS        
 
Sample Characteristics        40 
         
Hypothesis 1           52 
 
Hyposthesis 2           55 
 
Hypothesis 3            55 
 
Post-Hoc Analysis          64 
 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION        
 
Summary of Main Findings         67 
  
High Projection Use and Low Arousal in Individuals with    67 
 Early Onset of Potentially Traumatic Events 
 
High Identification Use and High Arousal in Individuals with    71 
 Early Onset of Potentially Traumatic Events 
 
 Dissociation Subscales and Defense Use       75 
 
Case Studies           76 
 
High Projection Users         77 
 
High Identification Users         82 
 
Clinical Implications of the Current Findings      88 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research      89 
 
Conclusion          92 
        
APPENDICES 
 
 A : Diagnostic Criteria for DESNOS       94 
 
 B : Summary of Defense Mechanism Manual Scoring Categories     95 
 
 
REFERENCES           96 
 
  
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure      Description     Page 
1 Group Comparisons of Defense Use on High vs. Low Arousal Cards  54 
2 Interaction Effect between use of Projection and PTE onset predicting SCR rate 59 
3 Interaction Effect between use of Identification and PTE onset predicting   61 
SCR rate 
4 Physiological Profiles of Case Studies: High Projection & High Identification  87 
Users with Early and Late Onset of PTEs 
  
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table      Description     Page 
1  Participant Demographics        41  
2 Trauma Type and Symptom Severity between Trauma Onset Groups  42 
3 Descriptive Statistics         44 
4 Defense Use of Entire Sample and across Trauma Onset Groups   45  
5 Correlations between Defense Use across Sample     46 
6 Comparison of Defense Use between Low Arousal and High Arousal Cards 47 
7 Physiological characteristics of Entire Sample and by Onset of PTEs  48 
8 Correlations between Skin Conductance Variables     49 
9 Gender differences and Defense Use; Gender differences and   50 
Physiological Reactivity 
 
10 Correlation Analysis between Age and IQ on Defense Use and    51 
 Physiological Reactivity 
 
11 Differences in Proportional Defense Use between groups for    53 
Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety Cards 
 
12 Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity,  57 
Onset of PTE, Use of Projection, Predicting Physiological Arousal  
 
13 Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity,  60 
Onset of PTE, Use of Identification, Predicting Physiological Arousal 
 
14 Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity,  63 
Onset of PTE, Use of Denial, Predicting Physiological Arousal 
 
15 Correlations between Defense Use, Skin Conductance and MDI Subscales  66 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 
It is well established that trauma has an overwhelming impact on the mind and body. 
Early psychoanalytic theories of trauma have laid down a bedrock of understanding of how the 
mind and psychic structure develops. Trauma has been a vital concept to understand through a 
psychoanalytic lens, as much as it has been at the genesis of fundamental psychoanalytic theory 
itself. Currently, psychoanalytic literature is inundated with compelling models explicating the 
etiology, complex sequelae and experiences of trauma. The concept itself has recaptured our 
popular attention with a kind of fury, due largely in part to the sociopolitical climate of our 
times. However, it has only been in the last 30 years that the clinical description of PTSD has 
emerged as a psychiatric category.  
Despite the abundance of research on trauma, defining trauma has remained elusive. 
What makes a trauma, traumatic? Moreover, recent epidemiological studies (Breslau, 2009; 
Kessler et al., 2005; Brewin et al., 2000) show that PTSD is present in a significant minority of 
the populations studied following exposure to trauma. According to Lee & Young (2001), up to 
93% of the general population report exposure to traumatic events, but only 5-12% develop 
PTSD. Certain types of trauma, pre-trauma vulnerability factors, as well as post-trauma 
environments, have been found to be important in determining whether someone develops PTSD 
after a traumatic event (Brewin et al., 2000). In the last decade, PTSD research has significantly 
expanded due to an avalanche of research by modeling from bio-behavioral science, cognitive 
psychology, and neuroscience. We can understand PTSD not only as an anxiety disorder from a 
psychological perspective, but as a physical illness that impacts the body, compromising multiple  
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systems including the immune, endocrine, and limbic systems. Qualitatively different from 
stress, we know that trauma results in long-lasting biological change (van der Kolk & Saporta, 
1991). 
Yet, there is still inadequate knowledge about the etiology and vulnerability factors of 
PTSD (Lee & Young, 2001). Moreover, the integration of research models has been limited. Few 
have empirically investigated trauma from a multi-disciplinary perspective. The current study is 
a response to this gap of integrated knowledge, about the mechanisms mediating the etiology of a 
traumatic response. Specifically, the study’s primary interest is to expand the phenomenology of 
psychic collapse that is so well documented in the psychoanalytic literature by connecting it with 
the rich psycho-biological evidence of how trauma impacts the body. As an attempt to explore 
the idea that trauma lives in the body and is mediated by the mind, this study will investigate this 
link empirically. It proposes to do so by examining the psychological variable of defense use 
with a physiological variable of autonomic reactivity, in a population of adults who have had 
exposure to potentially traumatic events. 
This systematic integration of psychoanalytic theory with psychobiological models can 
help deepen our understanding of varied traumatic responses and appropriately consider how to 
expand and modify treatment approaches.  A core assumption of this study is that understanding 
the unconscious meaning that an individual attaches to their trauma is an integral part of 
recovery. This can help unlock individuals from the grips of traumatic organization.  
 
Synopsis of Literature Review 
 
The relevant literature will be reviewed in the following section. To begin, a brief history 
of the concept of trauma will follow. A definition for the term trauma as it will be used in this 
study will be delineated. Next, an overview of the current diagnostic categories of PTSD and the 
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more discriminating features defining Complex Trauma or DESNOS (Disorders of Extreme 
Distress, Not Otherwise Specified) will be discussed. These diagnostic categories will help 
organize a discussion around some of the hallmark experiences of numbing, dissociation, 
hyperarousal and hypervigilance that is so central to a traumatic response. They will also help 
differentiate the experience of adults with an early, and more chronic history of trauma from 
those with an adult onset of potentially traumatic experiences.   
Next, the phenomenological experience of “psychic collapse” that is well elaborated in 
psychoanalytic clinical writings will be reviewed. This section attempts to bring to life the 
experiential aspects of traumatic response and suffering. Contemporary psychoanalytic theories 
and paradigmatic models of trauma (Bonomi, 2003; Bromberg, 2003; Levy & Lemma, 2004; 
Laub & Lee, 2003; Mills, 2008; Tarantelli, 2003; Verhaeghe & Vanheule, 2005) provide rich 
clinical descriptions of some of the characteristic impairments of traumatized adults who tend to 
defensively avoid symbolization and have lost the capacity to “think.” How might these 
dynamic, unconscious processes also be investigated through current psychobiological and 
information processing research models? The hypotheses of this study aim to address this 
challenge. 
The next section will define and review the concept of defense and defense mechanisms. 
A brief and selective review of key ideas from an ego-psychological perspective will follow. 
This perspective articulates a model of how psychic structure is formed and how the mind 
develops.  Ego psychology theory emphasizes the biological basis of psychoanalytic theory and 
provides a useful framework with which to link current psychobiological findings as reviewed in 
this study. This will tie in to a review of more contemporary theories of defense, specifically 
covering a developmental model and manual (The Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM)) for 
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measuring defenses as outlined by Phebe Cramer. The DMM will be used to measure defense 
use for the participants in this study. This measure will help elucidate possible evidence of any 
pre-existing structural deficits that result from, or may be a precursor to traumatic experiences. 
The final section will survey the psychobiological impact of trauma and review recent 
information processing theories. Psychoanalytic concepts will be tied to these current research 
findings and conclude the present study’s rationale for how a study of defense mechanisms 
contributes important information about the impact of trauma on mental operations, bodily 
responses to threat and the development of psychic structure. 
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CHAPTER 2 : REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Defining Trauma - A Brief History 
 
“After I was rescued and taken to the Grenoble hospital, I was told 
repeatedly how ‘lucky’ I was to be alive, and for a short while I 
even believed this myself. At the time I did not yet know how 
trauma not only haunts the conscious and unconscious mind, but 
also remains in the body, in each of the senses, ready to resurface 
whenever something triggers a reliving on the traumatic event. I 
didn’t know that the worst – the unimaginably painful aftermath of 
violence – was yet to come” (Brison, 2002, p. x) 
 
The aftermath of traumatic events to an individual’s life is complex and 
multidimensional.  The consequences can run far and deep, and are steeped in an essential 
paradox: that the experience of selfhood is shattered, but that it must survive perforce, by virtue 
that time and life carries on.  
The introduction of posttraumatic stress disorder as a diagnosis in 1981 was a milestone 
in recognizing the far-reaching implications of traumatic experiences into adulthood.  It was first 
introduced into the DSM-III as a response to the combat reactions experienced by Vietnam 
veterans. It was derived from conceptualizations of early researchers of war trauma and included 
the symptoms of re-experiencing, numbing/avoidance, and hyperarousal (DSM-III, 1980). The 
diagnosis spoke to a real need at the time, when researchers were also beginning to investigate 
other types of trauma from rape, domestic abuse/neglect, and childhood sexual abuse in 
particular (Courtois, 2004). Though this newly available PTSD diagnosis emerged to a real need, 
it began to cover a far wider range of traumatic experiences, well beyond those of combat 
soldiers (Courtois, 2004). In response to this not-so-perfect fit, as well as to the numerous studies 
indicating PTSD’s high rate of comorbidity with other disorders, researchers began to reconsider 
what such co-occurrence meant about the diagnosis. Judith Herman termed “complex trauma” 
after reviewing the clinical picture of survivors of prolonged, repeated trauma who presented 
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with more differentiated symptoms (1992).  These individuals exposed to trauma over 
developmental time periods suffered from a multitude of psychological problems including 
“depression, anxiety, self-hatred, dissociation, substance abuse, self-destructive and risk-taking 
behaviors, revictimization, problems with interpersonal and intimate relationships (including 
parenting), medical and somatic concerns, and despair” (Courtois, 2004, p. 413). In addition, 
these experiences were categorized as comorbid conditions rather than essential elements of a 
complicated reaction to trauma. Under a similar mission, Bessel van der Kolk led a field trial 
study for PTSD, delineating a syndrome named DESNOS (Disorders of Extreme Stress Not 
Otherwise Specified), based on findings that some individuals also consistently presented with 
features not captured in the PTSD criteria.  There has been strong empirical support for these 
observations (Gold, 2004; Courtois, 2004; van der Kolk, 2005).  
The diagnostic criteria for DESNOS covers three broad areas of disturbance. (Appendix 
A includes a listing of current diagnostic criteria). These include: (1) a symptomatic picture that 
is more complex, diffuse, and tenacious than in simple PTSD- including a combination of 
somatic, affective and dissociative symptoms; (2) characteristic personality changes, including 
deformations of relatedness and identity, disturbances in relationships, and alterations in self-
perception; (3) the survivor’s vulnerability to repeated harm, both self-inflicted and at the hands 
of others (Herman, 1992b).  
These complex reactions were found difficult to treat and varied according to a number of 
differentiating factors including the age and developmental period when trauma occurred, the 
kind of trauma itself – including the severity and duration of experience, the support received at 
the time of trauma and factors around disclosure of the trauma. Van der Kolk emphasizes the 
importance of developmental factors in particular, reiterating that long-term adaptations to 
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trauma vary greatly depending on the victim’s developmental stage, the relationship of victim to 
perpetrator, and individual factors like temperament: 
“Naïve one-to-one notions about the causal relationships between 
trauma and these disorders would oversimplify the very complex 
interrelationships among specific trauma, secondary adversities, 
environmental chaos and neglect, nature of preexisting and 
subsequent attachment patterns, temperament, special 
competencies, and other contributions to the genesis of these 
problems.  However, if clinicians fail to pay attention to the 
contribution of past trauma to the current problems in patients 
with these diagnoses, they may fail to see that they seem to 
organize much of their lives around repetitive patterns of reliving 
and warding off traumatic memories, reminders, and affects” 
(1996, p. 183). 
 
Despite the continued advancement and delineation of varying traumatized responses, the 
construct of PTSD continues to be a source of scientific controversy and debate. The complex 
trauma concept and DESNOS category help to highlight important differentiating factors of the 
effects of assaults on victims’ sense of safety, trust, self-worth and most importantly, their loss of 
a coherent sense of self (van der Kolk et al, 2005).  In addition to the hyperarousal and 
hypervigilance in relation to external dangers that PTSD sufferers experience, complex trauma 
poses an internal threat of being unable to “self-regulate, self-organize, or draw upon 
relationships to regain self-integrity”  (Courtois & Ford, 2009, p. 17). Understanding this 
characteristic shattering of selfhood experience is essential to a study of traumatic response. It is 
this defining feature of trauma which is under investigation in this study. 
 
Psychoanalytic Theories of Trauma 
 
 “Traumatic experiences are initially imprinted sensations and 
feeling states and are not collated and transcribed into personal 
narratives…our interviews with traumatized people as well as our 
brain imaging studies with them seem to confirm that traumatic 
memories come back as emotional and sensory states with little 
capacity for verbal representation…they may be encoded 
differently from memories for ordinary events…perhaps because 
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extreme emotional arousal interferes with hippocampal memory 
functions…This failure to process information on a symbolic level, 
which is essential for proper categorization and integration with 
other experiences, is at the very core of the pathology of PTSD” 
(van der Kolk, 1996, p. 296). 
 
Contemporary psychoanalytic theories and clinical writings have attempted to address the 
pervasive and overwhelming impact of trauma, leading to a severance of the mind, or inability to 
think, in traumatized adults. The implications of this severance are not only relegated to a deficit 
in mental operations but also refer to a severance between mind and body experiences as well – 
the mechanisms of which will be explored in this study. The contributions from psychoanalytic 
writings will be reviewed in order to ground a subsequent discussion of unconscious processes, 
in the form of defense mechanisms and their relation to traumatic response.   
 
Time and space, interrupted.  
 
-“Time is the brain’s glue” (Modell, 2005, p. 556). 
 
 Clinical discussions of traumatic experience commonly include a phenomenon of 
repetitive timelessness. That is, trauma is described as occurring “out there,” and not as an event 
related to an experiencing subject, the “I” (Laub & Lee, 2003). The event is dissociated as an 
external event from the survivor’s life so that their traumatic memories, which are self-contained 
and ongoing, exists in a separate world, apart from the world of their present lives. Survivors are 
unable to, and often do not want to reconcile these different worlds. Thus the memory is 
timeless. Caruth writes: "traumatic experience...suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct 
seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it (1996, pp. 91-92). She 
continues to describe that what can be so persistently damaging about traumatic experiences is 
"the fact that threat is recognized as such by the mind one moment too late. The shock of the 
mind's relation to the threat of death is not the direct experience of the threat, but precisely the 
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missing of this experience, the fact that, not being experienced in time, it has not yet been fully 
known" (p. 62). It is an experience therefore, which cannot be experienced. 
 Carole Tarantelli (2003) reiterates the utterly external experience of trauma when she 
likens the effects of catastrophic psychic trauma to an explosion of the mind: “in so far as an 
explosion disintegrates whatever is in its epicenter, it cannot be perceived or experienced or 
thought for there is nothing left to do so” (p. 916). Even though trauma is described temporally, 
Tarantelli reminds us that it is not a process, but “an absolute sudden absence,” where the mind’s 
defenses cannot divert the proliferation of non-stop anguish, where the mind is in an absolute 
absence of defense, in an archaic, primitive state of mind (p. 920). The action of the explosion on 
the mind as she describes it, is to disintegrate it: “psychic structure is disarticulated so that the 
parts are no longer in relation to each other and functioning as a whole” (p. 920).  
 
Losing the mind: The inability to think. 
 
-“It is in the nature of trauma to evade our knowing of it” (Laub & Lee, 2003, p. 449). 
 
Many psychoanalytic writings capture the experience of psychic collapse as a state of 
mindlessness or as the mind losing its capacity for symbolization (Bonomi, 2003; Boulanger, 
2005; Bromberg, 2003; Bucci, 2003). The individual enters a state where thought and action 
collapse, so the psychic space where reflection could take place is shut down. Meanings become 
too threatening to entertain so that thinking and perception are replaced by “concrete mental 
entities that cannot be explored” (Caper, 1998, p. 145). These ideas are similar to the writings of 
Bion, whose theories were predicated on the fundamental role that thinking played in structuring 
psychic experience. Bion himself was influenced by his own traumatic experiences of war and 
loss. He described how constricted his own thinking became as he prepared for battle: 
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“In desperation I stopped thinking about past or future: I began 
taking compass bearings of every object within my limited view. To 
my relief my fear began to ebb away. This scene was to be 
repeated over and over again in this new horrid shape throughout 
the war until at last it began to lose its horror by force of repetition 
(Bion, 1982, p. 201).  
 
Bion’s theories brought a relational meaning to the term “thinking,” emphasizing that its 
goal is the emotional awareness of self and others. Billow, eloquently summarizing Bion’s ideas, 
writes that  
“To satisfy the ‘need for awareness of an emotional experience,’ 
the developing individual must first depend on others to make 
sense of experience. Early in development, reality cannot be 
apprehended and constructed without others. Even for those whose 
reality sense has matured, frequent social validation remains 
necessary. […..}Thinking necessarily activates primitive, turbulent 
emotions, and reinstates powerful early anxieties involving 
separation and loss, and fear of new and unknown experience. 
Absence of needed objects (including objects of knowledge such as 
the complexities of one’s feelings, or another’s) stimulates thinking 
to the extent to which one tolerates frustration {…} ” (Billow, 
2003, p. 72). 
 
Most importantly, Billow continues: “Thinking hurts. The human being suffers from 
needing something painful. But fearful of pain, even the strongest sometimes evades what he or 
she needs, and often chooses instead ways of avoiding thinking” (2003, p. 72).  
 
Self-coherence: Affective disruption and going-on being. 
 
Winnicott’s writings also capture the complex paradox of traumatic experience, linking 
the experience of time with an emergent concept of self. As he writes about the experience of 
self-continuity, he describes how the experience of being self-conscious can imply a kind of 
split-off experience. That is, being so self-conscious compromises the sense of “going on being” 
and becomes too far removed from the experience of being within the body and living in the 
present (1949). His writings on how to view pathology in the context of where mind and body 
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lose integration are especially useful to an understanding of relational trauma. In addition, he 
describes a model of psychic structuring; how the failures of having our essential needs met 
bring about an awareness of space and time within the first six months of life. 
Winnicott describes how an infant’s incipient capacity to endure a moment when her 
needs aren’t immediately met, exposes a sense of time. That is of course, if the need is met 
within a “good enough” timeframe. If that experience of delay for the infant exceeds a tolerable 
limit, then that is when a disrupted self-experience is created; when the mind becomes an entity 
outside the infant’s once seamless existence of early psyche-soma. The mind then becomes over-
active and attends reactively to the mother’s absence or inconsistency. Winnicott depicts a model 
of health whereby an infant’s mind is developed in a way that helps the infant tolerate failures in 
mothering, to use her mental capacity for delay and to experience time in order to sustain an 
image of her “good enough” mother. In contrast, a more pathological mind creates discontinuity 
in the experience of “going on being” as the infant spends excessive mental energy trying to 
connect back with mom. This deprives the infant of a crucial experience of self-cohesion and 
agency. Thus, the emergent “me” and “not me” experiences are formed through reconciliation of 
the loss of the idea that the world is not actually just an extension of the mind-body experience of 
early infancy.  
Winnicott’s ideas are in sync with Bion’s writings on the significance and “painful 
nature” of thinking (Billow, 2003, p. 73). Bion, as aforementioned, also contended that “thinking 
inherently involves an exchange of painful, primitive feelings” (Billow, 2003, p. 73) The ideas of 
Bion and Winnicott will reverberate in the ensuing discussion of the structuring of defenses, as 
they inform Cramer’s developmental defense mechanism model. The relationship between 
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psyche-soma is integral to understanding how psychic structure develops and thus how a break in 
this continuity of development might lead to traumatic failures. 
 
Defining Defenses – An Ego Psychology Perspective 
 
“Defenses not only keep thoughts, images, and drive-impulses out of consciousness, but also 
prevent their assimilation by the thought-organization” (Hartmann, 1965, p. 56). 
 
When Freud revised his topographic model of the mind, he was driven primarily by his 
clinical observations that there existed parts of the ego, namely the defenses, that were operating 
unconsciously (Freud, 1926).  His revised structural model included a more complex view of 
how the ego managed both conscious perceptual capacities as well as unconscious 
responsibilities for other defensive operations.  
 Anna Freud further emphasized the role of defenses and the difficulty in distinguishing 
between defended and undefended communication (Mitchell, 1995). She was less interested in 
repressed content than she was in understanding how it was that the ego kept things out of 
conscious awareness. She also brought an important developmental perspective to the theory of 
defenses which placed emphasis on early childhood experiences.  
Heinz Hartmann further defined the ego as a substructure of personality, defined by its 
functions. Specifically, he stressed the importance of understanding unconscious process from 
the point of view of adaptation to the external world. “I want to stress…that defense-processes 
may simultaneously serve both drive-control and adjustment to the external world…The ego 
serves adaptation, inhibition and synthesis…” (1965, p. 385). The ego’s relation to reality was 
seen as a central function (Hartmann, 1965). Also, the notion of autonomous ego functions 
became explicated. He countered Freud’s idea that all mental functions were born out of 
intrapsychic conflict. Instead, he viewed the ego to have important independent functions. For 
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instance, the ego organizes and controls motility and perception – of the outer world and 
perception of the self. The ego also acts as a protective barrier against external and internal 
stimuli. The ego tests reality by action (not necessarily motorically) and by thinking, which can 
be thought of as a kind of trial action. The ego can inhibit and delay discharge to allow for a 
safer adjustment to the outside world as well as lessen the impact of internal stimuli. And 
importantly, the ego is the signal of danger from which defense is initiated (Hartman, 1965).  
In delineating these autonomous ego functions, Hartman made an important contribution 
to understanding the mutual influences of ego and id development and how the structure is 
differentiated. Hartman begins acknowledging Freud’s theory: “In ontogenesis, the id-ego 
differentiation follows the leads of outer and inner perception, of motility, and of the systems of 
preconscious memory traces, of experience and learning. The replacement of hallucination by 
thinking, of direct motor discharge by action, is an essential element in Freud’s theory of ego 
development” (1952, p. 166). He outlines several forces as constituting ego development 
including the impact of reality, the instinctual drives, and inborn characteristics of the ego and 
their maturation. Some defense mechanisms, he argues from this perspective, have a hereditary 
core. An important part of this theory is understanding that there are intrinsic physiological 
processes underlying activities of the ego and which influence the timing, intensity, and direction 
of ego development (Hartman, 1952). He outlines the apparatuses of perception, memory and 
motility as being inborn and part of the biology of an individual before they become expressive 
of conflict and experience. Thus, these have been in existence and functioning before conflict 
occurs in a “conflict-free” sphere of functioning (1952). 
“It may be that very early processes in the autonomous area—
cathectic organizations, but also physiological mechanisms that 
develop in interdependence with them, factors like postponement of 
discharge and also what Freud calls the protective barrier against 
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stimuli and even reflectory defenses against unpleasant stimuli—
are genetically speaking precursors of what at a later stage we call 
defense mechanisms” (Hartman, 1952, p. 170).  
 
Rappaport further detailed the specifics of the ego’s autonomy from the drives and from 
the external environment, stressing that the ability to stay independent from the drives allowed 
one to have a solid relationship to the outside world (1951). He helped answer questions of how 
psychic structure is formed and how the ego maintains its independence from the environment as 
he investigated how the ego’s autonomy, in the face of its inevitable relationship to conflict - is 
destroyed. How does it adapt to reality? And what is conflicted with the drives? 
“We must remember that the motor, perceptual, and memory 
apparatuses, as well as other inborn apparatuses such as those of 
affect expression, stimulus barrier, etc. have definite thresholds 
which are their structural characteristic. These structural 
characteristics will set limits to the discharge of drive tension, that 
is, to the pleasure principle, even when the need-satisfying object 
is present, and even before drive discharge is prevented by the 
absence of the need-satisfying object. The very nature of structure 
will always prevent total discharge of tension. The existence of 
inborn structural elements in the undifferentiated phase may be 
what precipitates developmentally the differentiation of it into the 
ego and the id. The developing ego then integrates these structural 
apparatuses and re-represents their discharge-limiting and 
regulating function in forms usually described as defenses. These 
are the foundations of the primary autonomy of the ego” 
(Rappaport, 1967, p. 363).  
 
Rappaport stresses that the ego’s independence from the environment is guaranteed by 
the ego’s relationship to the drives. The drives guarantee that behavior that may not be permitted 
by the environment, will continue. Rappaport investigated instances when the ego’s autonomy 
from the id was broken down; he noted it in periods of intensified drives, such as adolescence, 
during stimulus deprivation, and in hypnotic states when someone is reducing their attention to 
the environment and the hypnotist tries to interfere with reality oriented thinking. The drive 
controlling structures depend on the environment to function effectively against the drives. He 
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then investigated what interfered with the ego’s autonomy from the environment and noted that 
massive intrapsychic blocking of the instinctual drives as well as danger and fear is what enlist 
the drives to prompt surrender of autonomy.  
The importance of the drives in Rappaport’s theory is particularly relevant to the 
rationale of the present study. When drives aren’t satisfied, it creates an experience of delay. And 
it’s this delay in time that builds psychic structure. It’s the experience of frustration that leads to 
thought and structure – and to the building of a complex set of memories that can make a 
sustainable object. He writes: 
 “Delay of discharge may be due to structural as well as 
environmental conditions: either structural limitations or absence 
of the need-satisfying object may bring it about. One consequence 
of delay is that experiences preceding, surrounding, and perhaps 
even following gratification, accumulate in the form of memory-
traces. The organization of these memory-traces is of primary 
interest for the theory of thinking. Evidence seems to be available 
to show that such memories are organized around those drives, in 
the delay and/or discharge of which they emerge first as 
hallucinatory images and later as ideas – that is, around the drives 
of which they are representations” (1951, p. 693). 
 
The disequilibrium of drive states – or displeasure, is seen as the motivator for the first 
thought. Freud, as mentioned above by Hartman, pointed to hallucinatory wish fulfillment as the 
first thought. If the object is unavailable, the infant will try to cathect some “memory-trace” or 
representation of it that can be brought back. This representation can be partial or whole and 
invariably will be conjured from some physiological experience, as stated earlier in Hartmann’s 
writings. Using Freud’s terms, the image will be hallucinated, but it is some kind of evoking of 
the memory. This is what Rappaport calls the first thought and thus, it is crucial that it is in the 
delay of gratification that generates it. Memory will always be part of thought – as one evokes 
the memory of the object. The model is such that one is never really perceiving anything fully 
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apart from memory. Memory exists in the body, even before ideation. The memory of a mother 
for instance, might come with feelings of satisfaction – the warmth, pleasure, and smell of this 
experience underwrites a kind of procedural memory.  
To summarize, it is this delay of gratification in time that motivates and structures an 
emergent thought. This thought, at its earliest phase for an infant, can be thought of as a memory 
trace originating from the body. The significance of a caretaking other as an essential component 
of this memory trace, reiterates the aforementioned theories of Bion and Winnicott, who stress 
how early relationships powerfully impact developing psychic mechanisms. This theoretical 
model stresses the significance of physiological drive delay, the importance of time, and the 
essential role of an ‘other’ in shaping how the mind comes into being. It also lays down a 
framework to understand how an experience that is too overwhelming – in time or intensity can 
traumatize one’s capacity to think, to relate, to connect back to the body. These early theoretical 
models provide a useful lens to think about the impact of trauma, and particularly early, 
developmental trauma, on a cohesive self-experience.   
 
Contemporary Research on Defense Mechanisms 
The ego then, is responsible for a host of related abilities and executive processing 
functions involving cognition and affect, including information processing, reality testing, 
memory and perception (Beosky, 1995). George Vaillant describes the ego as “the integrated 
brain,” which bridges the emotional limbic system with the executive functioning of the frontal 
cortex, and which “conveys the mind’s capacity to integrate inner and outer reality, to blend past 
and present, and to synthesize ideas with feelings” (1993, p. 7).  
 In terms of defense mechanisms, modern psychodynamic theorists and researchers have 
continued in the tradition of Anna Freud, viewing defense mechanisms as essential elements of 
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adaptive ego-functioning and self-concept formation (Cramer, 1991, 2006; Vaillant, 1992, 2000). 
Vaillant (1993) described defense mechanisms as “regulatory self-deceptions” that function like 
the ego’s version of the body’s immune system, protecting the mind from vulnerabilities to 
potentially overwhelming negative emotional states, the way white blood cells act to stave off 
infections. This view of defenses as normative and adapative also implies that the adaptiveness 
of defense use is context relevant  (Cramer, 1991, 2006; Vaillant, 1993). In situations in which a 
person has no control over a difficult situation, use of a defense mechanism would serve to 
alleviate the anxiety and distress that could distract from problem-solving. However, when faced 
with a situation in which real-world solutions exist, utilizing defense mechanisms could be 
detrimental to functioning. Overusing defenses may lead to distorting an individual’s perception 
to the point of ignoring threat.  
 From an object relations point of view, the role of defenses is integral in terms of how 
individuals moderate their emotions in order to maintain their relationships and ties to important 
others. Tuber (2012) writes about the “holy trinity” of “self-affect-other” as a paradigm for 
depicting personality formation and thus, understanding the formation of defenses (p. 37). This 
paradigm stresses how “the very nature of our experience of our selves and others in interaction 
is always bathed in an affective mileu” (2012, p. 37). Thus, as individuals begin to manage their 
emotions as a way to organize and expand their experiences of self, they need also to manage 
arising emotions to maintain their ties to others. How much they need to modulate their emotions 
depends in part on how these others respond to them. As a helpless infant, the impact of others is 
essential to survival and the more they would need to rely on others to contain them. Caretakers 
provide a kind of stimulus barrier to protect against dangerous external factors as well as 
overwhelming inner sensations. Tuber reiterates that the role of defenses early in life depends 
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more on caretaking others. As individuals develop cognitively and mature affectively, they 
become more able to contain and self-regulate their emotional experiences. These viewpoints are 
not at all dissimilar to the ego psychology theories previously reviewed in terms of the 
emergence of defenses arising from bodily, affective states.  
 Using Tuber’s paradigm of self-affect-other, the development of defenses is explained as 
arising from a maturation along a broad continuum of experiences within this paradigm. The 
range from primitive to mature defenses can generally be mapped onto a developmental line, 
where primitive defenses like denial are generally developed earlier in life as opposed to a 
defense like intellectualization. The cognitive maturation that is required between denial and 
intellectualization is apparent. However, Tuber (2012) reminds us that a simplistic, hierarchical 
view of defenses will fail to account for defenses that can continue to develop with a level a 
complexity throughout development: 
“If we acknowledge the simple statement that defenses are 
cognitive strategies, it seems reasonable to posit that certain 
defenses, if they emerge in early life, can have a range of 
sophistication from primitive to more nuanced as we mature. Other 
defenses, however, take a certain degree of cognitive maturity for 
them to arise in the first place, but they too can become more 
nuanced and differentiated over time. This model would allow for 
a broader, and temporally longer, continuum for a defense 
mechanism such as denial or avoidance, defenses that typically 
arise in the first months of life but continue in an often more subtle 
manner throughout the course of life” (p. 39). 
 
 This is an important point for the purpose of this study and its focus on three main 
defenses of denial, projection, and identification. Though they may originate early in the course 
of development, these defenses can be seen in more nuanced and sophisticated ways throughout 
adult life.  
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Developmental Model Of Defense – The DMM 
 
 Longitudinal research on defense usage has lent support to the categorization of defenses 
along developmentally based hierarchical lines (Cramer, 1991, 2003, 2006, 2008). Cramer’s 
approach, in line with Tuber’s model, assumes not only a developmental nature of defense 
mechanisms, but also describes the life course of defense use itself, as part of normative 
cognitive development in childhood and adolescence. Cramer (2006) proposed that the Piagetian 
(1952) stages of cognitive development implied the existence of developmental periods during 
childhood and adolescence for which certain defense mechanisms would be more prominent than 
others. As a child passed through these stages of increasing cognitive complexity, the use of 
certain defenses would increase, while use of more simple, immature forms of defense would 
typically decline. She points out however, that although the use of immature forms of defense 
decline, they still remain part of an individual’s repertoire. At any given point in an individual’s 
developmental history, they have access to currently predominating as well as previous forms of 
defense. 
 Cramer developed the Defense Mechanism Manual – a scoring system (DMM; Cramer, 
2000) to identify and classify defense mechanisms in narratives derived from the story-telling 
projective test, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943). Cramer identified three 
major defensive categories—Denial, Projection, and Identification, which encapsulated several 
variations of defense according to core defensive themes. Each of the three defensive categories 
required different degrees of ego complexity and represented a different developmental period. 
Denial was the most immature of the three defenses and reflective of the cognitive capacities of 
early childhood. Projection was moderately immature and reflective of the cognitive abilities of 
older children and early adolescence. Identification was relatively mature and reflective of the 
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improved cognitive capacities of late adolescence and early adulthood compared to earlier 
developmental periods. Cramer drew on psychoanalytic theory to further conceptualize each 
defensive category as having developmental roots in the sensorimotor reflexes of infancy. 
 According to Cramer, Denial described mental maneuvers that were based on wholesale 
negation of reality, which could involve such phenomena as a person literally blocking out, 
withdrawing from, or misperceiving outward events or internal experiences. As explained by 
Cramer: “Denial is a simple defense, accomplished by the single operation of negating a thought, 
feeling, or perception, as in, ‘It didn’t happen’ (2006, p. 23). The essence of Denial was 
distorting or “not seeing” reality, which Cramer proposed was developmentally rooted to the 
earliest of self-protective sensorimotor reflexes—the ability of the infant to close its eyes to shut 
off stimulation from the outside world. Denial was thought to be the defense predominantly used 
in young childhood. 
 Projection encompassed mental maneuvers which involve misattribution of hostile or 
otherwise threatening feelings, attitudes and impulses to other people or the outside world. While 
still an immature defense, Projection is considered more cognitively complex than Denial, since 
it requires that the ego has the capacity to unconsciously differentiate the self from the outside 
world, as well as uphold a moral judgment about what is acceptable and what is not. Cramer 
proposed that the origination of this defense was the infant’s reflex to “spit out” noxious food or 
unwanted objects placed in its mouth. Projection was thought to become the predominant form 
of defense in early adolescence. 
 The category of Identification was tied to the ideas of self, identity and affiliation and thus 
required increased cognitive complexity to achieve. According to Cramer: “Identification is the 
process of taking on as one’s own (internalizing) the attitudes, beliefs, values, or behaviors of 
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another, so as to protect oneself from feelings of weakness or helplessness” (2006, p. 23). An 
example would be when a person tries to copy the tone of voice, words and gestures of an 
authority figure to get through a difficult situation. Cramer conceptually linked Identification to 
the infant reflex to take in food and other good things by mouth (i.e., incorporation). Cramer 
points out that use of the defense of Identification involves evoking internalized representations 
of other people, and not only reduces anxiety but bolsters the sense of self without distorting 
reality. It is the defense most frequently used during late adolescence, during the period of 
identity formation. Freud’s concept of hallucinatory wish fulfillment is paralleled here. 
 Cramer’s research with child and adolescent populations lent empirical support to the 
developmental sequence of these defenses in human development (Cramer, 1997, 1998). She 
found that use of denial normatively peaks in early childhood at approximately age 3, then 
slowly declines in use, while use of projection slowly increases until peaking at age 10 before 
declining, while identification emerges later in middle childhood and does not peak until 
adolescence. Therefore, Cramer’s categorization of defenses follows a hierarchy from Immature 
(Denial) to Moderately Mature (Projection) to Mature (Identification), as based on observable 
developmental sequences.  
 Since its repeated validation of studies with children, the DMM has also been utilized with 
samples of adults to assess defensive functioning. Studies utilizing the DMM in adult 
populations indicate that these defensive categories can be found in all ages even if they are not 
found to the same frequency as in child populations (Cramer, 2006). The utility of this scale is its 
shared foundation in a developmental model of psychic structuring; one that inheres the psyche-
soma inter-relationship. 
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Impact of Trauma 
 
  “What becomes disorganized is the whole series of action systems 
that carry out the intentions of the ego: cognitive, coordinative, 
executive (sensory motor) and autonomic” (Kardiner, 1969, p. 
177) 
 
In 1941, Kardiner coined the term “physioneurosis” to describe posttraumatic stress. He 
explained that while people with PTSD reacted to their environment with emotional constriction, 
their bodies continued to react to certain physical and emotional stimuli as if there was a constant 
sense of threat (van der Kolk & Saporta, 1991). The individual’s tolerance for intense affects is 
lowered and their stress sympathetic response system is triggered more frequently. Perry and 
colleagues (1995) explain that “everyday stressors that previously may not have elicited any 
response now elicit an exaggerated reactivity” (p. 278).  In other words, there is a loss of 
neuromodulation so central to PTSD leading to an increase in emotional reactively in general: 
traumatized people go immediately from stimulus to response without being able to make 
intermediate psychological assessments of the cause of their arousal, which causes them to 
overact (van der Kolk & Saporta, 1991). This emotional responsiveness, is often an unconscious 
response. It is this unconscious response, and perhaps the resulting or accompanying inability to 
think, which is under investigation in this study. When the stress response has been triggered, the 
less advanced systems in the brain, such as the brainstem and limbic areas (rather than frontal 
cortex systems) can become dominant. As a result, abstract thought, concentration, and access to 
language seems to become impaired (Perry et al., 1995). This is a concept previously reviewed in 
terms of a breakdown of symbolic functioning. Here, it is discussed from a physiological 
perspective. 
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Psychobiological Impact 
 The autonomic nervous system, mediated by the amygdala is supposed to alert the 
individual to the presence of a threat (Yehuda, 2002). The brain is able to communicate the 
magnitude of the threat by releasing excitatory neurotransmitters and firing neurons that 
correspond to the perceived level of threat (Siegel, 1999). However, when the autonomic nervous 
system is constantly being set off by minor stimuli, the individual is no longer able to rely on her 
bodily cues to be an accurate alarm system (van der Kolk, 2007). According to Siegel, “repeated 
patterns of intense emotional experiences may engrain chronic alterations in the degree of 
sensitivity” (1999, p. 248).  
Evidence suggests that the longer PTSD symptoms persist, the less important the role of 
the original trigger becomes when trying to understand the underlying symptomatology 
(McFarlane & Yehuda, 2007). Once neurophysiological alterations in the brain become 
established, the disorder seems to become entrenched. The “kindling model” suggests that 
affective destabilization leaves a “biological memory” that leaves the individual more vulnerable 
to future episodes of destabilization (McFarlane & Yehuda, 2007; Yehuda, 2002). The traumatic 
event sets off a domino effect of biological consequences that are difficult to modify once they 
have become ingrained. Van der Kolk & McFarlane explain, “This new organization of 
experience is thought to be the result of iterative learning patterns, in which trauma-related 
memories become kindled; that is, repetitive exposure etches them more and more powerfully 
into the brain” (2007, p. 8).  
In a meta-analysis conducted by Pole (2007) studying the psychophysiology of PTSD, 
the general notion that PTSD is associated with persistent hyperarousal, exaggerated responses to 
startling sounds, and elevated responses to external and internal trauma reminders was supported. 
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In the PTSD literature, the psychophysiological processes commonly measured included facial 
(muscle) contractions, heart rate, skin conductance (sweat gland activity), and blood pressure. 
Typically, these measures were expected to show increase under conditions of distress. However, 
the meta-analysis usefully pointed out that each measure has its own biological underpinning as 
well as unique interpretation that could be informative about the pathophysiology of PTSD. For 
example, a dominant relationship in skin conductance as opposed to heart rate may imply a 
special role of the sympathetic nervous system (where skin conductance is primarily governed) 
as opposed to the implication of the parasympathetic nervous system, which is also implicated by 
heart-rate. Thus, it is important to understand the directionality and dominance of these 
psychobiological mechanisms of change. 
Furthermore, research indicates the complexity of psychobiological responses to trauma. 
It has been reviewed thus far that trauma results in a myriad of split or dissociated experiences of 
mind and body. Traumatic memories are unintegrated sensorimotor experiences that are 
recurrent, involuntary, and mostly nonverbal. They can be charged with hyperaroused, intense 
affects involving fear and/or sadness. And they can also include intense bodily reactions. 
However, they can also involve hypo-arousal - with little affect including somatic and affective 
numbness. Nijenhuis & Boer’s (2009) review of the psychobiology of traumatization attests to 
the complexity of these responses and argues that many psychobiological researchers simply 
expect traumatized individuals to respond to reminders of trauma with fear. This may include 
elevated heart-rates and increased blood pressure, or a general dominance of the sympathetic 
nervous system during a fight-flight response. While there is certainly evidence of this, as has 
already been reviewed, Nijenhuis & Boer’s (2009) review reminds us that this perspective could 
easily ignore that the responses of survivors often have rather different responses to reminders of 
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trauma – including a total submission to the perceived threat or a kind of detachment that still 
allows for high functionality. It can also include a fluctuation between responses.   
This dissociative response is well documented in the clinical literature, but not as easily 
evidenced empirically. Research has demonstrated that the most far-reaching disturbance of 
trauma revolves around the regulation of affective states. This affect dysregulation increases 
vulnerability to engage in a variety of pathological attempts at self-regulation, including 
dissociation.  
 Bromberg continues to describe the broadest purpose of a dissociative mental structure, 
as not just serving a protective insularity, but for regulation. He writes,  
“It is above all else a dynamic mental organization designed for 
affective self-regulation – a mental structure tailored to anticipate 
trauma but sufficiently permeable to be a potential doorway to 
therapeutic growth. Its insularity reflects the necessity to remain 
ready for danger at all times so it can never – as with the original 
traumatic experiences – arrive unanticipated. Its permeability 
reflects a capacity for authentic but highly regulated exchange 
with the outside world and similarly regulated spontaneity of self-
experience (2003, p. 904).   
 
Alan Schore’s (2002) contemporary research linking attachment and the neurophysiology 
of the child’s brain offers further evidence of trauma’s impact on affect regulation.  He writes, 
“the infant posttraumatic stress disorder of hyperarousal and dissociation sets the template for 
later childhood, adolescent, and adult posttraumatic disorders (PTSD), all of which show 
disturbances of autonomic arousal” (p. 19).  Schore’s (2002) compelling research suggests that 
the disorganized/disoriented attachment pattern is most often seen in severely abused and 
neglected infants.  These disorganized infants with traumatic attachment experiences negatively 
impact the early organization of the right brain, and thus produce deficits in its adaptive 
functions. Namely, this is the ability to emotionally understand and react to bodily and 
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environmental stimuli. The neurobiological evidence powerfully underscores the significance 
and impact of events in a child’s early history. Schore (2001) describes “early relational trauma” 
as “interactions that involve a strong activation of the attachment system that, although not 
obviously comprising maltreatment, can induce a failure in the integrative functions of 
consciousness at the beginning of life” (p. 478).  This perspective underscores how the long-term 
effects of trauma are numerous and complicated. The intrapsychic, relational, and social factors 
are not the only issues that contribute to the long-term adjustment to trauma. There are biological 
consequences of traumatization that impact individuals at different stages of development as 
well. Hence, this provides the neurological basis for the vulnerability to dissociative reactions in 
response to traumatic stressors later in life. 
On Cognition 
The phenomenological experience of psychic collapse has been earlier reviewed from a 
clinical psychoanalytic perspective. These experiences should be considered alongside 
contemporary theory and research on cognition and information processing models of 
posttraumatic stress. Cognitive studies have indicated that individuals suffering from PTSD are 
highly sensitive to traumatic information and cues (Buckley, 2000; Weber, 2008). These findings 
are further supported by neuroimaging studies that identify brain activity during exposure to 
traumatic stimuli. The brain shows activity in affective networks including the amygdala, 
orbitofrontal and anterior cingulated cortex. The theory has generally proposed that PTSD 
sufferers demonstrate sensitivity to threat-related stimuli as well as abnormal processing of 
neutral information. Individuals with PTSD have demonstrated poor performance on a variety of 
neuropsychology tasks that involve attention and memory (Buckley, 2000). Also, they 
demonstrate a selective bias towards trauma cues which may inhibit their ability to attend to 
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other information or provide interference in processing other kinds of information (Litz & 
Keane, 1989). However, this evidence is not entirely consistent with research that also evidences 
a capacity for enhanced cognition for neutral information. Behavioral results from other studies 
hint that threat-sensitive individuals may react with a hyper-alertness that enhances attention 
performance (Dennis et al, 2007).   
 Traumatic experiences may disrupt cognitive processes not only by overwhelming the 
individual with memories and emotions, but also failing to integrate into general cognitive 
schemas (Dennis et al, 2007). The psychoanalytic literature depicted a shattering of the mind 
after trauma which rendered a traumatic memory that never integrated into the self-experience – 
by virtue of its lack of spatio-temporal coherence. From a cognitive perspective, an individual 
may need to be much more alert to cues, needing more time to evaluate and integrate current 
experiences. According to Chemtob et al (1988), “. . . threat arousal inhibits the operation of 
other information-processing modes or schemata, thereby preventing their operation and further 
narrowing the attentional focus on threat-related stimuli” (p. 266). This places the emphasis on 
traumatic cognitions that dominate the mind and lead also to temporal delays in the perception 
process. Individuals with PTSD may be more susceptible and sensitive to ambiguity or novelty 
as well. 
The Present Study: 
A Paradigm to Study Defense Use and Physiological Reactivity 
  
Constructs of the unconscious mind and dynamic processes from psychoanalysis, 
together with advances in psychobiology and cognitive science are ripe for constructing links 
through empirical methods. This study attempts to integrate selective, core concepts from each of 
these domains in order to lay down a model to empirically investigate the impact of trauma on 
psychic functioning.  
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Skin conductance activity has been one of the most widely used response systems in the 
history of psychophysiology due in large part to its ease of measurement and sensitivity to 
psychological states and processes (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). It has been previously 
reviewed that the psychological and physical impacts of a traumatic event frequently do not 
cease after the end of the immediate event. Research also suggests that the trigger or cue that 
provokes psychophysiological arousal may not necessarily be directly related to the original 
trauma (e.g. Pitman, Orr, & Shalev, 1993). Reminders of the event may lead to an acute 
autonomic nervous system arousal. Physiological reactivity to cued reminders has been 
thoroughly documented in autonomic nervous system research (Pitman et al, 1993; Pole, 2007). 
In a meta-analysis by Pole (2007), findings supported the idea that individuals have physical 
reactions to internal (thoughts and feelings) and external (sounds, sights) cues. Participants with 
PTSD had elevated heart rate and skin conductance, an indicator of sympathetic activity. The 
findings suggest that PTSD is related to exaggerated sympathetic nervous system activity in 
response to proximal or distal trauma cues.  
In addition, it is important to note that individuals may be physiologically reactive to 
trauma cues without self-reports of emotional distress.  A study by Lazarus & McCleary (1951) 
which has been replicated in studies of brain activity, demonstrated that reactivity to cues is 
persistent and may occur outside conscious awareness. Furthermore, it has been researched 
(Fowles, 1988) that skin conductance activity is influenced primarily by activation of a 
neurophysiological behavioral inhibition system that is involved in responding to punishment, 
passive avoidance, or to frustrative nonreward (Dawson et al, 2007). In other words, unlike 
measuring a variable such as heart-rate, which is influenced primarily by activation of a 
neurophysiological behavioral activation system, skin conductance can tell us something about 
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inhibitory response, and the anxiety system. Thus, for the purpose of this study, measuring skin 
conductance during an anxiety provoking task (such as responding to TAT cards), where there is 
no active avoidance response to make, the skin conductance system should be the physiological 
system that would be most responsive. In fact, we would be able to observe mental, unconscious 
maneuvers of avoidance through the use of defenses. 
For the purpose of this study, trauma is defined by its impact – by the experience of 
psychic collapse that ensues and renders the mind unable to think and the body unable to live in 
real time. Chapter 1 began with literature from clinical psychoanalytic perspectives that bring 
this phenomenology to life. Next, relevant theoretical contributions from ego psychology were 
reviewed that conceptualize how the mind is structured and formed. This body of theory supports 
a model that links early physiological experiences - drives originating from bodily states – with 
developmental mental achievements. An integral link between psyche and soma is supported 
through this literature. This link continues to be supported in the next review of literature on 
defenses and defense development. This review supports a relationship between defense use and 
physiological processes, as well as a meaningful hierarchy of defense mechanisms that have a 
predictable course of development. 
In sum, this study capitalizes on the biological basis of psychoanalytic theory to 
investigate the impact of trauma on the development of defenses and physiological arousal. 
Linking these domains theoretically provides a means to hypothesize about the empirical links 
detailed below. 
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Study Hypotheses 
 
Rationale for Hypothesis 1 
 
Literature from ego psychology describes the ego as a substructure of personality which 
is defined by its functions. A central function of the ego is its relation to reality. The ego acts as a 
protective barrier against external and internal stimuli. Thus the activities of the ego such as 
action (not necessarily motoric) and thinking (which can be considered a trial action) allow for a 
safer adjustment to the outside world, and lessen the impact of internal stimuli. The ego can 
detect danger and thus is the place where defense is initiated. Defenses, as unconscious 
operations, play an important role in psychic structure formation. It follows from this theoretical 
standpoint that trauma can have a significant impact on ego development, compromising the 
structuring of the mind and influencing the defenses employed. This study predicts a relationship 
between the onset of potentially traumatic experiences and level of defense use. Exposure to 
early, chronic traumas throughout a lifetime have led to the conceptualization of complex 
trauma, as a disorder that leads to the loss of a coherent sense of self. It is surmised that earlier 
exposure to potentially traumatic events disrupt a continuity of self experience that can be 
reflected in lower level defense use, based on the impact on psychic formation. Individuals who 
have had exposure to potentially traumatic events early in their lives, as compared to individuals 
who were exposed as adults, or never exposed, will demonstrate patterns of lower-level defense 
use. These early onset individuals will also show a significantly greater use of these defenses.  
Hypothesis 1:  Individuals who endorse early onset (EO) of potentially traumatic events (PTEs) 
will demonstrate an overall pattern of lower level defense use compared to individuals with No 
Onset (NO) or late onset (LO) of PTEs.  
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Rationale for Hypothesis 2  
 
Research has indicated that the psychobiological response to trauma is complex. The 
development of a chronic trauma-based disorder is qualitatively different than a heightened stress 
response and carries a host of biobehavioral changes. Consistent with what we know about 
complex trauma reactions and symptomatology, traumatized individuals can experience states of 
hyperarousal and hyperreactivity as well as a traumatic re-experiencing that co-exists with 
numbing, avoidance, and states of dissociation. Some individuals may develop re-experiencing 
symptoms only, some may also develop avoidance and hyperarousal. The kindling process of 
persistent intrusive and repetitive thoughts can set up a chronically disordered pattern of arousal. 
To compensate for this chronic hyperarousal, individuals can demonstrate a biobehavioral 
response of avoidance and emotional numbing on an everyday basis. Thus, individuals can suffer 
both from a generalized hyperarousal that shuts down the sympathetic nervous system but also 
creates a more sensitive negative feedback inhibition and greater physiological response to 
specific threats or reminders. Arousal is regulated by the sympathetic branch of the autonomic 
nervous system and can be captured in physiological markers like changes in sweat gland 
activity. 
Hypothesis 2: The early onset (EO) group will demonstrate greater physiological reactivity to a 
stress-response task (administration of TAT) as indicated by overall changes in measures of skin-
conductance, as compared to the NO and LO group. 
Rationale for Hypothesis 3  
 
As stated, traumatic response is not limited to hyperarousal, but can include a 
deactivation and slowing of physiological response. Physiological reactivity represents one 
mediating mechanism in the hypervigilence towards threatening cues. Thus, the association 
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between low physiological arousal and symptoms of numbing and denial needs to be further 
explored. The pattern of defenses employed provide a way (as theoretical constructs) for us to 
understand unconscious, psychological process. Defenses inform us of the limits and of the 
strengths of anyone’s capacity to cope with stress. Defenses are also derived originally, from 
physical experiences. They have a relationship to mechanisms experienced from and in the body. 
Patterns of defense use will be measured simultaneously with physiological readings during the 
same stress-response task for individuals with no onset of PTEs, EO, and LO of potentially 
traumatic events in their lives. This provides an opportunity to investigate correlations between 
patterns of defense use with patterns of autonomic response.  
Hypothesis 3: During the same stress-response task (TAT administration), patterns of lower-
level defense use will correlate with arousal levels, moderated by the chronicity (age of onset and 
intensity) of PTEs in individual’s histories. Those individuals with early onset (EO) of PTEs will 
demonstrate a stronger correlation, regardless the direction of the relationship. (i.e. the 
correlation, direct or inverse, between defense level and arousal level will be stronger for this 
group than for the NO or LO group). 
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CHAPTER 3 : METHODS 
 
Sample 
The sample for the present study was derived from a pilot research project entitled 
“Social and Nonsocial Threat Appraisal in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, (SOCIAL SCAN)” that 
took place at The City College of New York. It was funded by The City Seeds Grant from City 
College, an interdisciplinary initiative for scientific collaboration within the College. The project 
was led by Principal Investigator, Denise Hien, Ph.D and Co-PI’s, Robert Melara, Ph.D., Lesia 
Ruglass, Ph.D., and Eric Fertuck, Ph.D.  
The sample for this study employed 43 participants. Participants were grouped by 
exposure to potentially traumatic events (PTEs), as endorsed by self-report on the Life Events 
Checklist: 14 who endorsed no onset of PTEs, 14 with early onset of PTEs, 15 with late onset of 
PTEs. This study utilized male and female participants between the ages of 18-65 from diverse 
racial/ethnic backgrounds who were recruited from IRB-approved newspaper and Internet 
advertisements in the metropolitan New York City area. Fliers were posted in targeted locations 
including community counseling centers, participating hospitals, rehabilitation centers and 
college campuses. 
Eligibility criteria included: 1) physically healthy; 2) normal or corrected normal visual 
acuity; 3) aged 18-65; 4) fluent in English; 5) able to provide informed consent; 6) meets DSM-
IV criteria for Criterion A only of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (exposure to a traumatic 
stressor) OR; meets criteria for sub-threshold PTSD (Cluster C or Cluster D); OR meets full 
criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Individuals with no onset of PTEs met Criteria 1-5 
only.  
Exclusion Criteria included: 1) Past or present psychotic disorder or Bipolar Disorder;  
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current major mood disorder or anxiety disorder allowed in up to 50% of the sample due to high 
clinical comorbidity rates 2) Current alcohol/substance abuse or dependence (past abuse prior to 
3 months before study permissible) 3) known history of seizures; 4) Participants with organic 
mental syndrome 5) poor vision acuity; 6) Participants at significant risk for suicide based on 
current mental state or history; 7) Participants refusing to be audio-taped. No onset PTE 
participants were excluded if they met Criteria 1) no past or current psychiatric illness including 
psychotic disorder, major mood disorder, anxiety disorder, personality disorder; along with 
Exclusion Criteria 2-7 from above.  
 
Procedures 
Trained research assistants and assessors conducted initial screening interviews.  
Responders to paper and online advertisements verbally consented to have an initial phone 
interview with a trained research assistant to determine eligibility. They were asked questions 
regarding demographics, basic medical and psychiatric history and substance use. Participants 
deemed eligible after the initial phone interview arrived for a baseline assessment where they 
were assessed using the following measures: Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (ToNI), The Life 
Events Checklist, Clinician Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-IV (CAPS), Multiscale 
Dissociation Inventory (MDI), Post Traumatic Symptom Scale Self-Report (PSS-SR), The 
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), and Galvanized Skin Conductance Measure (GSR).  
 
Measures 
 
1. Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (ToNI) is a language and culture-free test administered in 
15 minutes. It is a strong measure of general intelligence. Item content covers seven 
different abstract reasoning and problem-solving skills: generalization/classification, 
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discrimination, analogous reasoning, seriation, induction, deduction, and detail 
recognition (Brown et al, 1997). 
2. Life Events Checklist (LEC) is the self-report trauma assessment portion of the 
Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale. It consists of 17 items, including lifetime exposure 
to specific categories of traumatic events (natural disasters, sexual assault). Participants 
are asked to indicate whether a given event happened to them, if they witnessed it 
occurring to others, or learned about it occurring to someone else.  
3. Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) is a structured, clinical interview for 
assessing the cardinal and hypothesized frequency and intensity of signs and symptoms 
of PTSD. The CAPS measures DSM-IV symptoms of PTSD, associated symptoms of 
PTSD (e.g., survivor guilt), validity of responses, impairments in social and occupational 
functioning, and overall symptom severity. The CAPS has also been found to have sound 
psychometric properties. 
4. Multiscale Dissociation Inventory (MDI) is a fully standardized and normed 30-
item self-report test of dissociative symptomatology.  It measures six different 
type of dissociative response (disengagement, depersonalization, derealization, 
emotional constriction/numbing, memory disturbance, identity dissociation).  The 
MDI conceptualizes dissociation as a multidimensional variety of 
phenomenologically distinct symptom clusters.  Each symptom is rated according 
to its frequency of occurrence over the prior month on a scale of 1 (never) to 5 
(very often).  The scale provides a reliable and valid way to quantify and delineate 
specific types of dissociative symptoms. 
5. Post Traumatic Symptom Self-Report (PSSR) is a 17-item self-report inventory, which 
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assesses the frequency and severity of PTSD symptoms corresponding to the diagnostic 
criteria listed in the DSM-III-R modified for the DSM-IV.  
6. Thematic Apperception Test: (TAT; Murray, 1943; 20 minutes) is a widely used 
projective measure used in the study of personality, including defense use and style. The 
TAT consists of a series of cards with black and white scenes capturing a range of 
ambiguous and evocative scenes. 8 TAT cards were identified in the TAT literature as 
either most clinically useful or as generating the greatest amount of material (i.e., highest 
number of themes) across individual performances. These included cards that had been 
reviewed for scoring by Cramer’s Defense Mechanism Manual. The sequence of cards 
presented to participants were: 1, 2, 3BM, 8BM, 8GF, 10, 13MF, AND 18GF.  At the 
presentation of each of the TAT cards, all participants were reminded to answer five 
questions within their responses: what’s happening in this scene, what led up to it, what’s 
going to happen, what are the characters thinking, and what are the characters feeling. 
The TAT has been utilized as a stress-response task in previous studies (Cramer, 2003), 
given the ambiguous and ominous content of the cards.   
7. Galvanized Skin Conductance: This methodology measures electrical conductance in the 
skin through detecting variance in sweat gland activity. Since sweat glands become more 
active in association with the arousal of certain emotions (i.e. anxiety, anger), a higher 
number and amplitude of conductance fluctuations is correlated to heightened levels of 
stress. Utilizing this objective methodology to measure regulation of emotion greatly 
strengthens the validity of self-report findings from the study, as it removes both 
interviewer bias and placebo effect.   
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Plan for data analysis 
 
Aim 1: To assess defense mechanism use for all individuals in the Sample 
The Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM: Cramer, 1991) was used to measure the 
defense mechanisms of Denial, Projection, and Identification in participant’s responses to the 
TAT. The author trained to criterion in scoring TAT stories with the DMM through practice 
sessions using unrelated TAT response sets with 2 fellow clinical psychology doctoral 
candidates, under the supervision of an experienced trainer. The sessions focused on the 
operationalized scoring criterion of Cramer’s DMM. After training, all 3 coders independently 
coded 10 new TAT response sets (provided by the supervisor). When adequate (r > .80) 
reliability coefficients were achieved between these scores, it was assumed that the 3 raters were 
scoring response sets in a manner consistent with the DMM.  
12 randomly selected TAT response sets from this study were then transcribed by the 
author and scored by the author and one other reliable rater. Both coders were blind to all 
participants’ demographic data, trauma history, and physiological profile. To test inter-rater 
reliability, a two way mixed model intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was computed using 
absolute agreement as the standard. Then, the Spearman-Brown correction for double coding 
(2*r/r+1) was applied (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). ICC values are all in the excellent range (0.94 for 
Denial, 0.97 for Projection, and 0.97 for Identification) indicating excellent (.80 to .99) reliability 
between raters. The remaining protocols were subsequently coded by the author.  
 Each of the 8 TAT stories provided by the 43 participants were rated and scored for each 
of the defense mechanisms of Denial, Projection, and Identification. DMM scores were then 
derived for each of these 3 defenses. A total defense score was calculated, representing the sum 
of all defenses used. For example, the sum of scores for Denial Total, Projection Total, and 
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Identification Total. In addition, the proportional use of each of the defense mechanisms was 
determined. Denial Proportion, Projection Proportion, and Identification Proportion reflects the 
proportional use of each defense mechanism relative to total defense use. For example, a Denial 
Proportion score of .25 reflects the participant’s use of Denial relative to total defense usage, i.e. 
25% of total defense use is Denial.  
Aim 2: To collect and interpret physiological patterns of autonomic arousal through skin 
conductance response (SCR) variables 
This study utilized the ProComp2 multi-modality physiological recording equipment that 
used sensors to recognize variances in salt and water from sweat glands during the TAT 
administration. The detection of variances was possible because as the skin’s surface produces 
more sweat, the electrical conductivity increases, reflecting a higher reading on the device 
indicating higher levels of stress. (A normal range on a ProComp2 is between 0 to 30 
microSiemens. One microSiemen is equivalent to 0.4 parts per million sodium chloride (salt) and 
one meg ohm of electrical resistance.) The ProComp2 also provided both intrasession and 
summary statistics at the end of each TAT administration session. Several variables of skin 
conductance were determined for each participant.  
Skin conductance level (SCL) is a measure of the average number of responses, or level 
of arousal, a participant has throughout the entire TAT task. Individuals have a great degree of 
variability in their baseline SCL so it is not as dependable a measure than other variables. SCL 
can also be affected by environmental factors such as temperature and humidity in the room. 
Skin conductance response (SCR) rate is a measure of frequency of SCR, or how many skin 
conductance responses a participant has per minute. SCR amplitude is a measure of the strength 
of the SCR. It is calculated by taking all of a participant’s SCR’s throughout the task and 
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averaging their amplitude. The standard threshold for SCR amplitude in the literature, and used 
for this study is 0.2.  SCR rise and recovery time are highly correlated measures. SCR rise 
measures how quickly the SCR takes to reach its maximum level. A higher SCR rise time would 
take a longer time to reach maximum level, thus a lower SCR rise time should be related to 
sudden arousal, versus a higher SCR rise time indicating a slow, gradual arousal. SCR recovery 
measures the time it takes to return to the half-way point of arousal. 
Aim 3: Compare DMM scores and SCR responses for NO of potentially traumatic events, EO of 
PTEs, and individuals with LO PTEs.  
Descriptive statistical analyses will be used to compare these scores across groups in order to 
find correlations or significant relationships. 
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CHAPTER 4 : RESULTS 
 
Sample Characteristics 
Demographics 
The total 43 participants enrolled in this pilot study spanned a broad demographic 
background. There were no significant differences between groups with No Onset (NO) of 
Potentially Traumatic Events (PTEs), Early Onset (EO) of  PTEs and Late Onset (LO) of  PTEs 
with respect to age, gender, IQ, education, and race or ethnicity as depicted in Table 1. The 
average age of participants reporting No Onset of PTEs was 35 years (SD = 9). The average age 
reported in the EO and LO groups was 32 years (SD =12) and 36 years (SD =10), respectively. 
Participants in all groups had an average of 14-15 years of education, indicating some college 
experience. The racial and ethnic composition of all groups was not significantly different. On 
average, the composition was comprised of 32% Black, 21% White, 23% Hispanic, 12% Asian, 
and 12% identifying as Other. All groups also had similar monthly incomes, the sample’s 
average being $1489 (SD = $1181). The majority from each group identified as being single. 
About three-quarters of the NO and LO group was fully or partially employed and about one-
quarter of the EO group were fully or partially employed. 
Based on previous studies (Pelcovitz et al., 1997; van der Kolk et al., 2005), early onset 
interpersonal PTEs are defined as sexual or physical violence experienced before the age 14. 
Interpersonal PTEs are defined by inclusion of Life Events Checklist items endorsed for physical 
abuse/assault and sexual assault. Non-interpersonal PTEs include endorsements of natural 
disasters, transportation accidents, and exposure to toxic substances. Both the EO and LO groups 
endorsed multiple PTEs. To investigate how EO and LO groups differed on the kinds of 
potentially traumatic events they experienced, a chi-square statistic was conducted.  
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Table 1 
Participant Demographics (N = 43) 
 
 Entire Sample 
N = 43 
No Onset 
n=14 
Early Onset 
n=14 
Late Onset 
n=15 
Test statistic and 
significance 
Variable M (SD) Min Max M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F df p 
Age 
Education (years) 
IQ 
Monthly Income 
 
      34       (10) 
      15         (2) 
      97       (10) 
$1489 ($1181) 
19 
11 
72 
0 
 
59 
20 
123 
$5000 
 
35 (9) 
15 (2) 
98 (9) 
$1529 ($794) 
32 (12) 
     14  (2) 
92 (10) 
$890 ($1426) 
 
36  (10) 
      15   (2) 
      99   (9) 
$1355 ($1488) 
   .672 
1.00 
2.60 
1.09 
2 
2 
2 
2 
.52 
.37 
.09 
.35 
 n (%)   n (%) n (%) n (%) X2 df p 
Gender 
    Female 
    Male 
Race 
    Black (non-Hispanic) 
    White (non-Hispanic) 
    Hispanic 
    Asian 
    Other 
Marital Status 
    Married 
    Separated 
    Divorced 
    Single 
Employment 
    Full time 
    Part time 
    Student 
    Unemployed 
 
23(53%) 
20 (47%) 
 
14 (32%) 
9 (21%) 
10 (23%) 
5 (12%) 
5 (12%) 
 
 3  (7%) 
 1  (2%) 
   5  (12%) 
 34  (79%) 
 
16 (37%) 
17 (40%) 
  7 (16%) 
      3   (7%) 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
10 (23%) 
4 (9%) 
 
 5 (12%) 
3 (7%) 
4 (9%) 
1 (2%) 
1 (2%) 
 
2 (5%) 
     0 
     0 
11 (26%) 
 
 7 (16%) 
 5 (12%) 
     2 (5%) 
     0 
 
5 (12%) 
9 (21%) 
 
4 (9%) 
2 (5%) 
4 (9%) 
2 (5%) 
2 (5%) 
 
1 (2%) 
    0 
3 (7%) 
10 (24%) 
 
2 (5%) 
 7 (16%) 
3 (7%) 
2 (5%) 
 
8 (19%) 
7 (16%) 
 
5 (12%) 
4 (9%) 
2 (5%) 
2 (5%) 
2 (5%) 
 
      0 
1 (2%) 
2 (5%) 
12 (29%) 
 
 7 (16%) 
 5 (12%) 
2 (5%) 
1 (2%) 
3.59 
 
 
2.35 
 
 
 
 
 
6.90 
 
 
 
 
10.99 
2 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
8 
.17 
 
 
.97 
 
 
 
 
 
.33 
 
 
 
 
.20 
 
 
 
Note. No Onset = no onset of potentially traumatic events. IQ Score from TONI-4 using Index Scores: 70-79 = Poor, 80-89 = Below 
average, 90-110=Average, 111-120=Above average, 121-130=Superior, >130=Very superior.  
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Table 2 shows the Pearson chi-square results and indicates that EO and LO groups were 
not significantly different on whether they reported an interpersonal PTE (X2 = 0.45, p =.50) or 
non-interpersonal PTE (X2 = 0.17, p = .68). In addition, using both self-report and clinician-
administered measures, there were no significant group differences in symptom type or severity, 
as depicted in Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Trauma type and symptom severity between trauma onset groups (n = 29) 
 
 Early Onset 
(n = 14) 
Late Onset 
(n = 15) 
Test statistic and 
significance 
 N (%) N (%) X2 p 
Trauma Type 
Interpersonal    
Non-interpersonal 
 
 
 12  (85.7%) 
 12  (85.7%) 
 
 
  14  (93.3%) 
  12  (80.0%) 
 
 
.45 
.17 
 
.50 
.68 
 M(SD) M(SD) t(df) p 
Symptom Severity 
Re-experiencing 
    CAPS 
    PSS-SR 
Avoidance/numbing 
     CAPS 
     PSS-SR 
Hyperarousal 
    CAPS 
    PSS-SR 
Total Severity 
    CAPS 
    PSS-SR 
 
  
 9.93    (10.03) 
 9.71      (8.12) 
 
14.71   (14.93) 
14.43   (12.36) 
 
11.76   (10.80) 
9.93       (9.97) 
 
36.43   (34.91) 
34.07   (27.43) 
 
 
 
8.73     (9.45) 
9.53     (9.80) 
 
15.87 (13.86) 
15.40 (16.12) 
 
9.67     (9.04) 
10.53   (8.98) 
 
34.27 (29.99) 
35.47 (31.15) 
 
 
-0.31 (27) 
-0.05 (27) 
 
 0.22 (27) 
 0.18 (27) 
 
-0.58 (27) 
 0.17 (27) 
 
-0.18 (27) 
 0.13 (27) 
 
 
.74 
.96 
 
.83 
.86 
 
.57 
.87 
 
.86 
.90 
Note. PTE = Potentially Traumatic Event. Early Onset is PTE < 14 years old. Late Onset is PTE 
> 14 years old. Interpersonal traumas include sexual and physical assault and abuse; non-
interpersonal traumas include natural disasters, transportation accidents, exposure to toxic 
substances. CAPS = Clinician administered PTSD Scale, PSS-SR = Posttraumatic Symptom 
Scale Self Report.  
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Defense Use 
Defense variables were within acceptable limits for skewness and kurtosis, as indicated in 
Table 3. Table 4 depicts defense use for the entire sample as well as by PTE onset groups. The 
Total Defenses Used reflects the total sum of Denial, Projection, and Identification defenses used 
by the participant in their stories for all 8 TAT cards. The entire sample (N = 43) used an average 
of 31.88 (SD = 14.3) defenses during the TAT task. Of these, the most commonly used defense 
was Projection (M = 14.26, SD = 9.09), then Identification (M = 8.88, SD = 6.42), followed by 
Denial (M = 8.74, SD = 3.93). The Defense Ratio converts defense use into relative scores, with 
the use of each individual defense expressed as a proportion of total defense use. In this 
calculation, story length does not influence the defense scores. For the present study, 
proportional calculations will be used for analysis. When comparing ratio scores, the most 
commonly used defense was Projection (44%), followed by Denial (29%), then Identification 
(27%).  
Because each of the defense variables was normally distributed and the assumption of 
linearity was not markedly violated, Pearson correlations were computed to examine the inter-
correlations of the variables. Table 5 shows that one pair of defenses was significantly correlated. 
There is a medium to high, positive correlation between the use of Projection and Identification 
(r = .39, p < .01). This indicates that across the entire sample, the more individuals used 
Projection, the more likely they were to use Identification, and vice versa. 
To investigate how defenses were used on Low Arousal cards as compared to High 
Arousal Cards for the whole sample (N = 43), a two-tailed matched pairs t-test was conducted 
and revealed significant results. Table 6 shows that there was more average use of Denial on 
High Arousal Cards compared to Low Arousal Cards, t(42) = -5.08, p < .001. There was also 
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more average use of Projection on High Arousal Cards, as compared to Low Arousal Cards, 
t(42) = -8.64, p < .001. In contrast, there was more use of Identification on Low Arousal Cards,  
compared to High Arousal Cards, t(42) = 2.80, p = .008.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3   
Descriptive Statistics (N = 43) 
 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Proportion Denial .29 .14 .10 .63 .84 .19 
Proportion Projection .44 .15 .08 .77 -.14 .52 
Proportion Identification .27 .15 .00 .57 .19 -.83 
Proportion Denial in High Anx Cards .29 .14 .00 .57 .25 -.79 
Proportion Projection in High Anx Cards .52 .18 .13 .82 -.42 -.30 
Proportion Identification in High Anx Cards .19 .15 .00 .62 .85 .58 
Proportion Denial in Low Anx Cards .31 .23 .00 1.00 1.43 2.31 
Proportion Projection in Low Anx Cards .29 .18 .00 .75 .21 -.42 
Proportion Identification in Low Anx Cards .40 .23 .00 .83 .01 -.80 
SCR rate per minute (N = 38)* 6.73 3.88 .10 14.02 -.06 -.94 
Re-experiencing symptoms 6.28 8.98 .00 35.00 1.56 1.89 
Avoidance/numbing symptoms 10.33 13.63 .00 49.00 1.14 .18 
Hyperarousal symptoms 7.21 9.48 .00 32.00 1.04 -.13 
Total symptom severity 23.81 30.95 .00 116.00 1.15 .37 
Note. *Physiological data for 5 participants were not successfully obtained due to technical difficulties.  
Low Anxiety Cards: TAT 1, 2, 8GF, 10. High Anxiety Cards: TAT 3BM, 8BM, 13MF, 18GF. 
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Table 4 
 Defense use of entire sample and across trauma onset groups (N = 43) 
 Entire Sample 
(N = 43) 
No Onset 
(n = 14) 
Early Onset 
(n = 14) 
Late Onset 
(n = 15) 
Test statistic & 
significance 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD F p 
 
Total Defenses Used  31.88  14.30 29.14 8.27 34.47 18.79 31.86 14.02         .43 .66 
     Total Denial      8.74 3.93   8.00 3.68 7.87 3.26 10.43 4.52 1.19 .31 
     Total Projection 14.26 9.09 12.29 5.44 17.00 12.40 13.29 7.61 1.02 .37 
     Total Identification   8.88 6.42  8.86 5.11 9.60 6.77 8.14 7.52 .00 .99 
Low Anxiety Cards:    12.32 6.53 11.29 3.67 13.14 8.62 12.53 6.67 .29    .75 
     Denial Total      3.37 2.13   2.79 1.97 3.14 2.11 4.13 2.20 1.62    .21 
     Projection Total      3.89 3.70   3.21 2.29 4.71 5.08 3.73 3.35 .58    .56 
     Identification Total     5.07 3.67   5.29 2.98 5.29 4.27 4.67 3.89 .13    .88 
High Anxiety Cards:   19.56 8.40 17.86 5.01 21.00 11.16 19.80 8.24 .49      .62 
     Denial Total     5.37 2.56   5.21 2.46 5.00 1.92 5.87 3.18 .44    .64 
     Projection Total   10.37 6.30   9.07 3.93 12.29 8.45 9.80 5.72 1.01    .38 
     Identification Total    3.81 3.38   3.57 2.56 3.71 2.84 4.13 4.53 .10    .90 
 
Defense Ratio 
          
     Denial Ratio 29% 14% 27% 9% 26% 14% 35% 16% 1.11 .34 
     Projection Ratio 44% 15% 43% 17% 47% 14% 41% 14% .58 .56 
     Identification Ratio 27% 15% 30% 16%   27% 15% 24%   15% .39 .68 
Low Anxiety Cards:           
     Denial Ratio 31% 23% 24% 12% 25% 21% 45% 29% 1.62 .21 
     Projection Ratio 29% 18% 29% 20% 33% 19% 24% 16% .58 .56 
     Identification Ratio 40% 23% 47% 24% 41% 23% 31% 19% .13 .88 
High Anxiety Cards:           
     Denial Ratio 29% 14% 29% 13% 26% 13% 32% 17% .44 .65 
     Projection Ratio 52% 18% 52% 20% 55% 17% 48% 18% 1.01 .38 
     Identification Ratio   19% 15% 20% 15% 18% 12% 20% 18% .10 .90 
Note.  Early Onset is PTE (potentially traumatic event) < 14 years old. Late Onset is PTE > 14 years old. Defense Ratio refers to use of 
defense as a proportion of total defenses used. Low Anxiety Cards: TAT 1, 2, 8GF, 10. High Anxiety Cards: TAT 3BM, 8BM, 13MF, 
18GF.  
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Physiological Arousal 
The physiological data for 5 participants were not successfully obtained due to technical 
difficulties with the GSR apparatus resulting in poor conductivity. Of the total 38 participants 
whose physiological data was captured, all SCR variables were found to be within acceptable 
limits for skewness and kurtosis as shown in Table 4. 
The physiological characteristics of the entire sample (N = 38) is depicted in Table 7. The 
average Skin Conductance Response (SCR) rate for the entire sample (N = 38) was 6.73 (SD = 
3.88). The EO and LO group had close SCR rate means: 6.52 (SD = 4.68) and 6.53 (SD = 3.50) 
respectively.  
The skin conductance variables collected are known to be correlated with one another 
(Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). Table 8 depicts that the physiological variables of this sample 
were significantly inter-correlated. Overall, the higher the SCL, or number of SCR’s a participant 
had, the higher was their frequency and strength of responses: r = .74, p = .01 and r = .87, p = .01 
respectively. In addition, the faster or more sudden their arousal, the more quickly they 
recovered: r = .90, p = .01.  
Table 5   
Correlations between defense use across sample (N = 43) 
 
 1. Total Denial 2. Total Projection 3. Total Identification 
1. Total Denial 1   
2. Total Projection .26 1  
3. Total Identification .03 .39** 1 
Note**.  Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
 
4
7 
Table 6  
Comparison of defense use between Low Arousal Cards and High Arousal Cards (N=43) 
 Low Anxiety Cards High Anxiety Cards Low minus High Test statistic and significance 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) t df p 
Denial  3.37 2.13  5.37 2.55 -2.00 2.58 -5.08 42 .000** 
Projection  3.88 3.70 10.37 6.30 -6.49 4.93 -8.64 42 .000** 
Identification  5.07 3.67  3.81 3.38  1.26 2.94  2.80 42 .008** 
Note**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). Low Arousal Cards: TAT 1, 2, 8GF, 10. High Arousal 
Cards: TAT 3BM, 8BM, 13MF, 18GF. 
  
 
 
Table 7   
Physiological characteristics of entire sample and by Onset of PTEs (N = 38) 
 
 Entire Sample 
(N = 38) 
No Onset 
(n = 12) 
Early  Onset 
(n = 14) 
Late Onset 
(n = 12) 
Test Statistic 
& 
significance 
M SD M SD M SD M SD F p 
SC level 
SCR rate  
SCR amplitude 
SCR rise time (s) 
SCR recovery (s) 
2.99 
6.73 
0.20 
3.12 
7.75 
2.29 
3.88 
0.15 
1.37 
7.11 
3.29 
7.19 
0.23 
3.16 
6.90 
2.44 
3.51 
0.17 
1.24 
5.77 
3.00 
6.52 
0.19 
3.49 
9.98 
2.69 
4.68 
0.14 
1.80 
9.75 
2.68 
6.53 
0.19 
2.64 
5.98 
1.72 
3.50 
0.15 
0.74 
3.74 
.20 
.12 
.23 
1.26 
1.15 
.82 
.89 
.80 
.30 
.33 
Note. PTEs = potentially traumatic events. SC = skin conductance, SCR = skin conductance response. 5 
participants with poor SCR data were not included. 
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Table 8 
Correlations between skin conductance variables (N = 38) 
 
 1. SC Level 2. SCR rate 3. SCR 
amplitude 
4. SCR rise 
time (s) 
5. SCR 
recovery 
time (s) 
1. SC level 1     
2. SCR rate .74** 1    
3. SCR amp .87** .60** 1   
4. SCR rise time (s) -.59** -.84** -.55** 1  
5. SCR recovery time (s) -.50** -.79** -.49** .90** 1 
Note. SC = Skin Conductance. ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Relationships among Variables 
Independent samples t-tests and correlational analyses (Table 9 and Table 10) were 
conducted in order to determine whether there were any significant relationships between 
demographic characteristics (including age, gender, IQ) and either defense mechanism or 
physiological reactivity. There were no gender or IQ differences in the use of defenses or in 
physiological responses. Only age was found to correlate significantly with use of Projection and 
Identification as depicted in Table 10. As age increased, the total and proportional use of 
Identification decreased: r =-.44, p = .003 and r =-.35, p = .02, respectively. In addition, as age 
increased, the proportional use of Projection increased, r =.34, p = .03. Age did not have a 
significant effect on any of the SC variables. Therefore, age was used as a covariate in 
Hypothesis 3 regression models examining use of Projection and Identification. 
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Table 9 
Gender differences and defense use (n=20 males, n=23 females); 
Gender differences and physiological reactivity  (n=20 males, n=18 females) 
 
Variable 
M SD t df p 
Total Defenses   -1.13 41 .27 
     Males 
     Females 
29.25 
34.17 
11.13 
16.49 
   
Total Denial   -1.00 41 .32 
     Males 
     Females 
  8.10 
  9.30 
  3.80 
  4.04 
   
Total Projection     -.40 41 .69 
     Males 
     Females 
13.65 
14.78 
  8.19 
  9.96 
   
Total Identification   -1.33 41 .19 
     Males 
     Females 
  7.50 
10.09 
  4.15 
  7.79 
   
Denial Ratio    -.32 41 .75 
     Males 
     Females 
    .29 
    .30 
    .13 
    .14 
   
Projection Ratio     .62 41 .54 
     Males 
     Females 
    .45 
    .42 
    .15 
    .15 
   
Identification Ratio    -.32 41 .75 
     Males 
     Females 
    .26 
    .28 
    .14 
    .17 
   
SC level   1.44 36 .16 
     Males 
     Females 
  3.49 
  2.43 
  2.59 
  1.84 
   
SCR rate   1.17 36 .25 
     Males 
     Females 
  7.43 
  5.96 
  4.25 
  3.38 
   
SCR amplitude    -.16 36 .87 
     Males 
     Females 
    .20  
    .21 
    .15 
    .16 
   
SCR rise time (s)    -.94 36 .35 
     Males 
     Females 
  2.92 
  3.34 
  1.41 
  1.33 
   
SCR recovery time (s)    -.17 36 .87 
     Males 
     Females 
  7.56 
  7.96 
  7.21 
  7.20 
   
Note. SC = skin conductance, SCR = skin conductance response. 5 participants 
with poor SCR data were not included. 
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Table 10 
Correlation Analysis Between Age and IQ on Defense Use and Physiological 
Reactivity  
 
 Age (N=43) IQ (n=38) 
 r p r p 
 
Defense Use 
    
Total Defenses Used -.260 .092 .015 .926 
Total Denial -.097 .534      -.121 .441 
Total Projection -.054 .731 .020 .901 
Total Identification -.443** .003 .079 .617 
Defense Ratio (% of total):     
     Denial  Ratio  .029 .853      -.167 .286 
     Projection  Ratio  .336* .028 .055 .725 
     Identification  Ratio  -.349* .022 .093 .551 
 
Physiological Reactivity 
    
SC level -.128 .445   
SCR rate -.110 .512 .042 .800 
SCR amplitude -.106 .526 .148 .376 
SCR rise time (s)  .171 .306      -.060 .721 
SCR recovery (s)  .240 .146      -.214 .198 
 
Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis predicted that the Early Onset group would demonstrate an overall 
pattern of lower level defense use compared to those with No Onset or with Late Onset of 
potentially traumatic events. Three one-way within-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA) 
were conducted with the within-subjects factor being onset of PTEs (no onset, early, and late) 
and the dependent variables being the use of 3 defenses. The means and standard deviations are 
included in Table 4 where descriptives of defense use for the total sample have been previously 
reviewed. The assumptions of the ANOVA were met and analyses revealed no significant 
results. Whether one reported No Onset, endorsed Early Onset of PTEs, or Late Onset of PTEs, 
there were no significant differences between these groups in their average proportional use of 
Denial, Projection, or Identification respectively: F [2, 40] = 1.11, p = .34; F [2, 40] = .58, p 
= .56; F [2, 40] = .68, p = .68. Hypothesis 1 was unsupported. In order to determine whether 
there were group differences in proportional use of defenses on Low Arousal versus High 
Arousal cards, another three, one-way within-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA) were 
conducted. These results are depicted in Table 11, demonstrating no significant differences 
between groups for denial, projection and identification respectively: F [2, 40] = 2.12, p = .13; F 
[2, 40] = 2.30, p = .11; F [2, 40] = .02, p = .98. 
Figure 1 illustrates these non-significant group differences from Table 4, using the total 
number of defenses used. Notable in this depiction, is the overall greater use of Projection 
between arousal cards, across all groups. Also of note is the previously mentioned finding that 
Identification use was greater on Low Arousal Cards than High Arousal Cards for all groups. 
Implications of this trend are further discussed in a review of Hypothesis 3. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Differences in Proportional Defense Use between groups for Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety Cards (N = 43) 
 
 No Onset 
(n = 14) 
Early Onset 
(n = 14) 
Late Onset 
(n = 15) 
Test statistic and 
significance 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F p 
Denial Use on  
Low vs. High Anxiety Cards 
 
-.05 (.17) -.00 (.21) -.11 (.28) 2.12 .13 
Identification Use on  
Low vs. High Anxiety Cards 
 
.28 (.18) .23 (.18) .13 (.21) 2.30 .11 
Projection Use on  
Low vs. High Anxiety Cards 
 
-.22 (.21) -.22 (.23) -.24 (.23) .02 .98 
Note. Low Anxiety Cards: TAT 1, 2, 8GF, 10. High Anxiety Cards: TAT 3BM, 8BM, 13MF, 18GF. 
5
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Figure 1 
Group comparisons of defense use on High vs. Low Arousal Cards 
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Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis predicted that the Early Onset group, over Late Onset or No Onset 
group, would demonstrate greater physiological reactivity to a stress-response task, the TAT, as 
indicated by overall changes in measures of skin conductance including SCR rate and amplitude. 
The means and standard deviations of each group are included in Table 7, where physiological 
characteristics for the total sample have been previously reviewed. Three one-way within-
subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) were conducted with the within-subjects factor being 
onset of PTEs (no onset, early, and late) and the dependent variables being SC characteristics. 
The means and standard deviations and non-significant group differences are depicted in Table 7. 
Whether one reported No Onset of PTEs, endorsed Early Onset of PTEs, or Late Onset of PTEs, 
there was no difference between these groups in their SCR rates, F [2, 35] = .12, p = .89. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Low Arousal and High Arousal Cards were alternatingly 
administered during the TAT administration, thereby contributing to the limits of capturing card-
specific physiological data in this study. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The final hypothesis proposed an exploratory model to begin investigating the 
correlations between patterns of defense use with patterns of autonomic response for the EO 
group, predicting that for these individuals, their pattern of defense use and trauma onset would 
predict physiological arousal, over and above PTSD symptoms. Given this study’s interest in 
investigating a sample of vulnerable individuals who have been exposed to potentially traumatic 
events at an early age, the proposed model included only those individuals who reported any 
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PTSD symptoms, thus excluding those with CAPS scores of 0, even if they had exposure to a 
PTE. 
To investigate how well symptoms, use of defense, and onset of PTEs predicted 
physiological arousal when controlling for age, a hierarchical multiple regression was computed 
for each defense. The assumptions of linearity, normally distributed errors, and uncorrelated 
errors were checked and met. In Table 12, when age and CAPS symptoms were entered in Step 
1, they explained 23% of the variance in SCR rate, but not significantly, R2 = .23 , p > .05.
  
Table 12 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity, Onset of PTE, Use of Projection, Predicting Physiological 
Arousal (n = 23) 
 Coefficients 
 
Variable B SEB β R2 Δ R2 
 
Step 1 
  Age 
  CAPS symptom cluster severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
 
Step 2 
  Age 
  CAPS symptom severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
  PTE onset (early vs. late)   
  Projection defenses (proportional) 
 
Step 3 
  Age 
  CAPS symptom severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
  PTE onset (early vs. late)   
  Projection defenses (relative to total) 
  PTE onset  X  Projection defenses 
 
 
-0.03 
 
0.43* 
-0.26 
0.06 
 
 
0.04 
 
0.40* 
-0.26 
0.17 
0.57 
-20.34*** 
 
 
0.07 
 
0.43** 
-0.30* 
0.20 
8.53* 
-8.95 
-19.92* 
 
 
0.08 
 
0.20 
0.17 
0.16 
 
 
0.06 
 
0.15 
0.13 
0.13 
1.35 
4.69 
 
 
0.05 
 
0.13 
0.11 
0.11 
3.45 
6.19 
8.10 
 
 
-0.07 
 
1.01 
-.87 
.14 
 
 
0.11 
 
.93 
-.87 
.39 
.07 
-.69 
 
 
0.18 
 
1.00 
-.99 
.46 
1.03 
-.30 
-1.20 
 
.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.64*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.74*** 
 
 
 
.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.42*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.10* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.   Trauma onset was contrast coded with early onset = -1 and late onset = 1. PTE = Potentially traumatic events.   
 p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 5
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The beta weights suggest that the re-experiencing cluster of symptoms significantly contributed 
to the equation (B = .43, p < .05). In Step 2, when onset of PTE and proportional use of 
projection were entered, these entire group of variables significantly improved the prediction, 
explaining an additional 42% of the variability in SCR rate, over and above what is predicted by 
CAPS symptoms, R2 change = .42, F (2, 17) = 9.92, p <.001.  The beta weights suggest that 
when accounting for symptoms and onset of PTEs, the proportional use of Projection contributed 
most to predicting SCR rate, with all variables significantly contributing to the model (B = -
20.34, p < .001). 
Adding the interaction at Step 3 further improved the model, with the significant 
interaction suggesting that trauma onset moderated the relationship between projective defense 
use and SCR rate. Specifically, these two variables were significantly negatively correlated in the 
early onset group, but not significantly correlated in the Late Onset group, as illustrated in Figure 
2. Follow-up simple slope tests were performed to examine the effect of the interaction.  The 
slope of the early onset group was significantly different from zero (slope = -31.29, t = -4.61, p 
< .001) while the slope for the late trauma group was not (slope = -9.52, t = -1.26, p = .23).   
Thus the interaction is such that the late onset group showed no difference in SCR over the 
different levels of projection use, and the early onset group showed decreasing SCR with 
increasing projection use. Thus, for these symptomatic individuals with Early Onset of PTEs, 
using more Projection is associated with significantly lower physiological response than 
individuals with late onset PTEs. There were main effects of re-experiencing symptoms, trauma 
onset, and projective defenses in the final model. Each of these made unique, significant 
contributions, predicting 74% of the variance in SCR rate.  
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Figure 2 
Interaction effect between use of Projection and PTE onset predicting SCR rate (n = 23) 
 
Note. SCR = Skin conductance response. Slope of early onset = -31.29, t = -4.61, p < .001 ;  
slope of late onset = -9.52, t = -1.26, p = .23.  
 
 
The next model examined the potential interaction between use of Identification and SCR 
rate as shown in Table 13. Like the previous model, age and CAPS symptoms were first entered 
at Step 1. When symptoms, trauma onset, use of Identification, and the interaction between the 
variables were added, the model became significant. The entire group of variables with the 
interaction, significantly predicted SCR rate, F (1,16) = 6.15,  p < .05, adjusted R2 =.52. The 
beta weights suggested that re-experiencing, avoidance/numbing symptoms, as well as onset of 
PTEs all contributed significantly to predicting SCR rate. The interaction improves the 
prediction by 19%. This significant interaction effect suggests that trauma onset moderated the 
relationship between Identification use and SCR rate.
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Table 13 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity, Onset of PTE, Use of Identification, Predicting Physiological 
Arousal (n = 23) 
 Coefficients 
 
Variable B SEB β R2 Δ R2 
 
Step 1 
  Age 
  CAPS symptom cluster severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
 
Step 2 
  Age 
  CAPS symptom severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
  PTE onset (early vs. late)   
  Identification defenses (proportional) 
 
Step 3 
   Age 
   CAPS symptom severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
  PTE onset (early vs. late)   
  Identification defenses (relative to total) 
  PTE onset  X  Identification defenses 
 
 
-0.03 
 
0.43* 
-0.26 
0.06 
 
 
0.01 
 
0.46* 
-0.28 
0.07 
-1.14 
7.98 
 
 
-0.00 
 
0.55** 
-0.33* 
0.09 
-7.77* 
-5.08 
24.66* 
 
 
0.08 
 
0.20 
0.17 
0.16 
 
 
0.09 
  
0.20 
0.17 
0.17 
1.76 
5.56 
 
 
0.08 
 
0.18 
0.15 
0.15 
3.09 
7.18 
9.95 
 
 
-.07 
 
1.01 
-0.87 
0.14 
 
 
0.02 
 
1.07 
-0.92 
0.15 
-0.14 
0.29 
 
 
-0.01 
 
1.28 
-1.09 
0.20 
-0.93 
-0.18 
1.02 
 
.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.52* 
 
 
 
.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.19* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.   Trauma onset was contrast coded with early onset = -1 and late onset = 1. PTE = Potentially traumatic events.   
 p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Figure 3 
Interaction effect between use of Identification and PTE onset predicting SCR rate (n = 23) 
 
Note. SCR = Skin conductance response. Slope of Early onset = 19.52, t = 2.71, p = .01;  
slope of Late onset = -5.16, t = -0.65, p = .52 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the significant interaction. Follow-up simple slope tests were performed to 
examine the effect of the interaction.  The slope of the early onset group was significantly 
different from zero (slope = 19.52, t = 2.71, p = .01) while the slope for the late onset group was 
not (slope = -5.16, t = -0.65, p = .52).   Thus the interaction is such that the late onset group 
showed no difference in SCR over the different levels of identification use, and the early onset 
group showed increasing SCR with increasing identification use. That is, for symptomatic 
individuals with early onset of PTEs, using more Identification is associated with significantly 
higher physiological arousal than the late onset group. Table 14 followed steps from the previous 
models and examined the potential interaction between use of Denial and SCR rate. No 
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significant relationships or interaction was found between the variables, yielding no significant 
results for the model, F (7, 30) = .87, p =.54. 
In sum, the final hypothesis was supported by the regression models predicting SCR rate 
for the onset group in the use of Projection and Identification, but not in the use of Denial. That 
is, when controlling for age, individuals with early onset of PTEs who use Projection as their 
main defense (over Identification and Denial) showed lower physiological arousal, over and 
above symptoms. Furthermore, the more projection they used, the lower their skin conductance 
response rate would be. Individuals with early onset of PTEs who used Identification (over 
Projection and Denial) showed higher physiological arousal. The more Identification they used, 
the higher their SCR rates would be. Those who used Denial (over Projection and Identification) 
demonstrated no significant predictive relationship to physiological arousal. 
  
Table 14  
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Symptom Severity, Onset of PTE, Use of Denial, Predicting Physiological Arousal 
(n = 23) 
 Coefficients 
 
Variable B SEB β R2 Δ R2 
 
Step 1 
  CAPS symptom cluster severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
 
Step 2 
  CAPS symptom severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
  PTE onset (early vs. late)   
  Denial defenses (proportional) 
 
Step 3 
  CAPS symptom severity 
      Re-experiencing 
      Avoidance/numbing 
      Hyperarousal 
  PTE onset (early vs. late)   
  Denial defenses (relative to total) 
  PTE onset  X  Denial defenses 
 
 
 
0.43 
-0.26 
0.06 
 
 
 
0.42 
-0.31 
0.15 
-.75 
7.34 
 
 
 
0.42 
-0.31 
0.15 
-.56 
7.56 
-.63 
 
 
 
0.20 
0.17 
0.16 
 
 
 
0.20 
0.17 
0.18 
1.82 
5.65 
 
 
 
0.21 
0.18 
0.18 
4.18 
7.18 
11.88 
 
 
 
1.01 
-.87 
.14 
 
 
 
.93 
-.87 
.39 
.07 
-.69 
 
 
 
1.00 
-.99 
.46 
1.03 
-.30 
-1.20 
 
.23 
 
 
 
 
 
.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.32 
 
 
 
.23 
 
 
 
 
 
.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.  PTE = Potentially traumatic events.  p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Post-Hoc Analysis 
Hypothesis 3 produced 2 significant models predicting physiological increase and 
decrease depending on the trauma onset and type of defense proportionally used. Figure 2 
suggests that for a vulnerable and symptomatic group of individuals who experienced an early 
onset of PTEs, their greater use of Projection yielded a reduction in physiological reactivity. 
Figure 3 suggests that for the same vulnerable group, those who experienced early onset of 
PTEs, and who used proportionally more Identification, had an increase in physiological arousal.  
These findings counter the first two hypotheses of the study; namely that lower level 
defense use might be aligned with greater physiological reactivity with this early onset group. 
Following the developmental theory of defenses, it was hypothesized that the group using more 
Projection would have greater physiological arousal than the group using mostly Identification. 
The question emerged as to whether this discordance might be indicative of some dissociative 
process. Thus, the data collected from the parent study’s self-report measure of The Multiscale 
Dissociation Inventory (MDI) was incorporated into a post-hoc analysis for this study. Pearson 
correlations were computed to examine the inter-correlations between subscales of the MDI and 
all defense and SCR variables.  
Table 15 shows that Derealization subscale scores were positively correlated with use of 
Total Projection as well as Projection use in Low Arousal cards for the whole sample (r =.32, p 
<.05; r = .37, p <.05, respectively). In addition, the subscale of Memory Disturbance was 
negatively correlated with proportional use of identification (r =-.32, p < .05). Given that there 
were significant correlations for projection and identification, further Pearson correlations were 
computed to examine whether these correlations would differ between EO and LO groups. 
 Correlations indicated that proportional projection use on low arousal cards was 
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significantly positively correlated with Derealization Sub-scores in the early onset group, r = .67, 
p < .01, and positively correlated in the late onset group, but not significantly, r =.24, p = .40. A 
Fisher's r-to-z transformation was conducted to determine whether the two correlations were 
significantly different.  Results show that they were not statistically different from each other, z 
= -1.36, p = .17. 
Proportional identification was found to be significantly negatively correlated with 
Memory Disturbance Sub-scale scores (r = -.59, p < 0.5) in the early onset group. In the LO 
group, proportional identification was negatively correlated with Memory Disturbance, but not 
significantly (r = -.25, p = 0.37). Based on  medium effect sizes, these non-significant results 
may be suggestive of significant findings in a larger study. In short, there is some indication that 
there may be more distinctive, dissociative processes that relate to the unique pairings of defense 
use and physiological responsiveness. 
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Table 15  
Correlations between defense use, skin conductance and MDI scales 
 r 
 
Disengage-
ment 
Sub-score 
Deperso-
nalization 
Sub-score 
Derealization 
Sub-score 
Emotional 
Constriction 
Sub-score 
Memory 
Disturbance 
Sub-score 
Identity 
Dissociation 
Sub-score 
Skin conductance level .202 .234 .205 .034 .079 .157 
SCR rate per minute .029 .011 -.053 -.060 -.051 .012 
SCR amplitude .175 .145 .159 .012 .112 .213 
SCR rise time -.056 .047 .086 -.021 -.094 .006 
SCR half-recovery time -.081 .028 .071 .042 -.098 -.085 
Total defenses .055 .083 .187 .008 -.051 -.027 
Total denial -.077 -.029 -.011 -.102 .086 .072 
Total projection .126 .168 .315* .071 .055 -.049 
Total identification -.010 -.034 -.022 -.020 -.243 -.035 
Proportion denial -.047 -.058 -.090 -.077 .150 .132 
Proportion proj. .148 .184 .269 .168 .198 -.023 
Proportion ident. -.101 -.126 -.180 -.093 -.322* -.094 
Denial in low arousal cards -.090 -.124          .002 -.074 .082 .067 
Ident. in low arousal cards -.018 -.010         -.032 -.002 -.254 -.078 
Proj. in low arousal cards .153 .205 .372* .003 .047 .100 
Denial in high arousal cards -.045 .059         -.019 -.095 .064 .056 
Ident.  in high arousal cards .002 -.054         -.007 -.036 -.187 .018 
Proj. in high arousal cards .093 .122          .235 .100 .052 -.130 
Note. MDI = Multiscale Dissociation Inventory. SCR = Skin conductance response 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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CHAPTER 5 : DISCUSSION 
 
“I thought how unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought how 
it is worse, perhaps, to be locked in.” (Virginia Woolf, 1929, p. 24) 
 
 
Summary of Main Findings 
 
The exploratory nature of this study afforded an opportunity to examine some important 
theoretical constructs in light of empirical evidence. Namely, the study examined the hypothesis 
that early exposure to potentially traumatic events would have a qualitatively different impact on 
individuals than late onset of such events. The questions for the present study were inspired by 
clinical presentations of trauma survivors and psychoanalytic models that inform theories of 
mind, and that in turn impact clinical conceptualization and intervention. The differences were 
hypothesized to be evidenced by unique patterns of defense use and physiological reactivity. The 
main findings indeed support this hypothesis, demonstrating that the onset of potentially 
traumatic events is linked to distinct pairings between the use of a particular defense and its 
moderating impact on physiological reactivity. The overall aim was not to identify conclusive 
thumbprints branding early trauma survivors, but to better understand a potentially differential 
developmental relationship that may exist between unconscious defensive functioning and 
physiological reactivity.  
 
High Projection Use and Low Arousal in Individuals with Early Onset of Potentially 
Traumatic Events 
The first main finding revealed that a group of symptomatic adults who had been exposed 
to potentially traumatic events before the age of 14, and who tended to use projection as their 
main defense (over denial and identification), demonstrated significantly lower rates of 
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physiological reactivity than adults who were exposed to potentially traumatic events as an adult. 
Moreover, using proportionally more projection significantly reduced their physiological 
reactivity, compared to the late onset group. The implications of this finding suggest that this 
early onset group who used projection as their modus operandi, used it effectively, such that it 
lowered their arousal level during the stressful task.  
To briefly review, the advantage of measuring skin conductance is that the autonomic 
response system is not normally under conscious control. According to the theory, psychological 
stress will activate the use of defense mechanisms. The greater the stress, the greater the need for 
defense. Since stress also activates the autonomic nervous system, an increased use of defenses 
should be related to heightened physiological arousal. The use of defenses protects the 
participant from the conscious experience of anxiety, although arousal on the physiological level 
may continue (Cramer, 2003). 
That greater use of projection lowered the physiological stress response for these 
individuals is consistent with the developmental theory of this defense. Projection emerges as a 
defense of “expulsion” (Tuber, p. 40, 2012). This defense works effectively if it gets rid of 
noxious, unwanted, or unacceptable feelings by attributing them to someone or something else. 
The lowered physiological stress response with greater use of this defense can be interpreted as 
an indicator of its effective discharging of the negative affect.  
Of note, the Defense Mechanism Manual sub-category of projection that was 
ubiquitously used by participants in this study was the “Attribution of Aggressive or Hostile 
Feeling, Emotions, or Intentions to a Character, or Other Feelings, Emotions, or Intentions that 
are Normatively Unusual” (Appendix B). This category was scored when such emotions were 
attributed by the participant to a character in their TAT story, or when one character attributed 
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them to another character, but only if such attribution was without sufficient reason. In addition, 
references to a character’s face or eyes looking a certain way, or references to body position 
were also scored under this sub-category. The literature has suggested that individuals with 
PTSD demonstrate an expectation for threat and harm, as evidenced by selective attention to 
threat cues and tendency to interpret neutral or ambiguous stimuli as threatening. This 
hypersensitivity to threat is associated with heightened emotional responsiveness including 
hypervigilance (Garfinkel & Liberzon, 2009). Other neurophysiological findings support that 
PTSD is characterized by increased autonomic arousal in response to trauma-related stimuli, and 
that these individuals are hypervigilant because their increased physiological arousal predisposes 
them to readily process stimuli that are minimally threatening (Chemtob et al., 1998). What then, 
might explain this significant main finding of lowered physiological response?  
By examining the appraisal process itself, the literature suggests that the exact 
mechanisms of attentional bias remains mixed (Buckley, Blanchard, Neill, 2000), including 
findings that report that the development of PTSD is associated with specific appraisals 
(McNally, 2003; Ehlers et al., 1998) and coping styles (Aldwin and Yancura, 2004). Whether the 
pathways of appraisal are adaptive or maladaptive is multi-determined (Olff, et al, 2005).  For 
instance, epidemiological studies of PTSD prevalence has shown that compared to subjective 
characteristics, the objective characteristics of events were far less sufficient predictors, 
particularly with the chronic subtype of PTSD (Ozer et al., 2003). Subjective appraisals such as 
perceptions of loss, threat, and harm may explain divergent results about the risk for PTSD. 
Alternatively, divergent results in the literature have been interpreted in terms of habituation or 
accommodation to chronic exposure to stress, such as coping with air raids, and exposure to 
threat of terrorism (Arambasic, 1996; Zeidner and Bleich et al., 2003). There may be specific 
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adaptive modes of coping with ongoing threat, as well as a kind of stress-inoculation process that 
may be occurring.  
Beyond the appraisal of an external event as threatening, it has been researched that 
perceived controllability or belief in the effectiveness of coping can moderate biological stress 
response (Olff et al, 2005). For individuals in this study, it would appear that though they may 
perceive an elevated sense of threat, their ability to appraise effectually serves a protective 
function. The seeming incongruence of greater defense use and lower physiological arousal 
points towards the idea that goal-directed and self-preserving maneuvers employed by this group 
may be seen as an adaptive response associated with efficacy of ridding negative feelings and 
using skills primed for threat evaluation. By focusing on the how –whether the defense of choice 
is effective, over the what- the defense of choice itself, there is opportunity to interpret the 
findings from a strengths-based perspective. Reconceptualizing aspects of symptomatic 
hypervigilance as an adaptive, effective skill, might help patients apply these strengths towards 
other needed areas of weakness. Furthermore, given that these participants appeared to use more 
projection when endorsing greater symptoms in the Re-experiencing cluster of symptoms, it 
could be useful to reframe patients’ subjective symptoms (of intrusive recollections, distressing 
dreams, acting/feeling as if event were recurring, psychological distress and reactivity) using a 
perspective that underscores some aspect of their pro-active, adaptive responding.  
In considering how effective this defense use may be, study findings suggest that there 
are limitations to what can be interpreted. In the short-term, as far as moderating the 
physiological arousal based on a stress-inducing TAT task, the findings support an adaptive 
response. However while situational hypervigilance may be adaptive, it is difficult to determine 
the long-term effects of this defensive strategy. This is a symptomatic group of participants 
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whose marked reliance on projection corresponds to a significant increase in Re-experiencing 
and Hyperarousal symptoms. It is possible that while in the short-term, the use of this defensive 
strategy is effective, it has long run consequences, with evident stress-related symptoms. This 
defensive coping may impede broader information processing abilities and maintain anxiety. In 
addition, SCR rate, while found to be sensitive to threat cues (Phelps et al., 2001; Szpiler & 
Epstein, 1976), is a measure that captures sympathetic nervous system activation. This is distinct 
from endocrine and cardiovascular responses, which encompass both sympathetic and 
parasympathetic activity. Biological studies of PTSD have established that the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis in PTSD sufferers have a unique profile of elevated corticotropin 
releasing hormone (CRH). Moreover, in line with stress-response theory, PTSD is linked to the 
phenomenon of allostatic load (McEwen, B.S., 2002), referring to the cumulative strain on the 
body produced by repeated ups and downs of physiologic response, as well as elevated activity 
of physiological systems under stress. That adaptive situational hypervigilance may be linked to 
other potentially maladaptive, chronic (increased cortisol production, exaggerated startle 
response) behaviors complicate the symptom picture.  
 
High Identification Use and High Arousal in Individuals with Early Onset of Potentially 
Traumatic Events 
The second main finding with a group of vulnerable, symptomatic adults who had been 
exposed to a potentially traumatic event before the age of 14, and who tended to use 
identification as their main defense (over denial and projection), showed significantly higher 
rates of physiological reactivity than adults who were exposed to a potentially traumatic event as 
an adult. In addition, using proportionally more identification increased their physiological 
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response. The late onset group who used more identification had significantly lower 
physiological response compared to the early onset group. This finding suggests that the defense 
of identification may have been used differentially between individuals with early exposure 
versus late exposure to potentially traumatic events.    
Following the developmental model of defense development, identification comes with 
advances in object relations and the ability to differentiate between self and others. In short, one 
of the main functions it may serve is to protect self-esteem (Cramer, 1991).  In contrast to the 
simple expulsion characteristic of projection, identification is a defense with more affective 
sophistication. Use of identification allows for an internal transformation of affective experiences 
into more tolerable, manageable internal phenomena (Tuber, 2010, p. 41). Identification may be 
manifest in different ways. It may be seen in the wish or attempt to take on the skills or 
accomplishments of admired others, or acquire their personal qualities. Identification is also seen 
when the individual affiliates with another or group, for enhancing compromised self-esteem. 
Within a traumatically vulnerable group, a prevalent use of this defense may reflect a 
heightened awareness of one’s bad, malevolent, or threatened parts of self. The need to use this 
defense reflects some cognizance of these different parts. In this way, the defense operates by 
affiliating with someone unlike them, expressing an unconscious wish to preserve their own self-
esteem. The present study findings that for the early onset PTE group, physiological arousal 
increases with greater use of identification may be explained by the fact that unlike projection, 
the use of identification does not negate or expel unwanted feelings. The damaged self-concept 
persists and perhaps is reified in contrast to an “other,” despite attempts to affiliate with a “good” 
self. Cramer delineates this use as “defensive identification,” or a way of avoiding anxiety and 
maintaining self-esteem (2006, p. 108). This may be in contrast to the mechanism used by the 
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late onset group, who demonstrates significantly lower arousal when using identification as their 
modus operandi. Without a chronic history of developmental trauma, and thus a long-standing 
“bad” self, it is possible that this group was able to use this defense more effectively and rely on 
a “good” self that was not as compromised with later exposure to potentially traumatic events. 
Cramer refers to this mechanism as “developmental identification” (2006, p. 110), a necessary 
part of normal psychological development that contributes to the formation of a conscience, of 
the ego-ideal, and of “identity.” Cramer explains that in contrast to defensive identification, 
developmental identification leads to structural change in the self-representation (2006, p. 110). 
Recalling early ego-psychology theories (Freud, 1926, Hartman, 1965, Blum, 1987), the 
development of identification involves taking experiences with the outside world and placing 
them inside to create new ego structures. With early trauma survivors, it is theoretically surmised 
that such structural formation has been compromised and thus it is really the use of defensive 
identification that is called upon during situations of stress and anxiety. 
In early psychoanalytic studies on the consequences of trauma, the defense of 
identification has been reviewed around the concept of identification with the aggressor. First 
formulated by Anna Freud in her classic book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936), 
this concept is related to the mastery of stress and shock trauma and to the tendency of the ego to 
be active where it was formerly passive or helpless (Blum, 1987). It is understood as a response 
to feeling overwhelmed with threat, and the adoption of behaviors, perceptions, emotions, and 
thoughts of the aggressor. The tendency to identify with the aggressor is rooted in the child’s use 
of identification to overcome feelings of fright and helplessness. The developmental roots of 
identification with the aggressor are described by Spitz (1965) as identification with the “no” and 
the beginnings of internalization of parental prohibitions which the child will begin to verbalize 
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on her own, later in development (Blum, 1987). Once again, when considering an early 
environment where this normal structuralization of prohibitions and ego-development are 
disrupted, and when a sense of the world as safe no longer exists, this defense may be essential to 
make one’s self disappear. It would be safer to transform ourselves into someone else’s image of 
us, into the very thing that threatens us, in order to protect ourselves. 
Contemporary psychoanalytic writings have investigated the links between identification 
with the aggressor and dissociation as part of traumatic response (Frankel, J. 2002; Davis, J.M. & 
Frawley, M. G. 1994). Davies and Frawley (1994) write: 
“In addition to preservation of relational bonds, the survivor’s 
identification with the perpetrator protects her from contacting the 
helplessness and vulnerability of her victimized self. Survivors 
report a paradoxical sense of power and control when they cut 
themselves or drive recklessly, or engage in sex with men they 
hardly know. Identifying with her perpetrator, the survivor 
experiences this illusory empowerment, denying that her self-abuse 
is hurtful. …Like their victimizers, they successfully split off a 
sense of themselves as vulnerable, scared, and out of control” (p. 
132). 
 
Frankel (2002) writes about how habitual identification with the aggressor can lead to 
masochism, chronic hypervigilance, and other personality disorders as a response to trauma. He 
describes the: 
“precocious development of hypersensitivities, super-intelligence, 
even clairvoyance, whose purpose is to assess the environment and 
calculate the best way to survive. Knowing the aggressor ‘from the 
inside,’ in such a closely observed way allows the child to gauge at 
each moment precisely how to appease, seduce, flatter, placate, or 
otherwise disarm the aggressor. Without conscious thought, the 
child suddenly discovers the precocious abilities that are needed 
for the job (p. 104).  
 
In these conceptualizations of the ways that the defense of identification may be used, the 
prominent need to protect against imminent threat is apparent. Perhaps in contrast to the way that 
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projection was used effectively, there may be more dissociative mechanisms involved in using 
identification with the aggressor, assisting an adaptive response by selectively splitting off only 
those feelings that may pose a threat in the immediate situation if they were expressed. The 
presence of such dissociative features may be one explanation for the evidence of higher 
physiological arousal with greater use of this defense in the early onset group. Davies (1998) 
discusses the distinction between dissociation and repression where repression has the 
unconscious “goal of keeping certain experiences entirely and permanently out of awareness, 
whereas dissociation stresses the failure to integrate certain fundamentally incompatible 
interpersonal experiences and the vertical splitting of consciousness into independent centers of 
associational interconnection” (pp. 58-59).  
The literature on the relationship between dissociative reactions and PTSD has been 
extensive, yet mixed. One meta-analysis of pre and peritraumatic risk factors for PTSD 
concluded that peritraumatic dissociation was the strongest predictor of PTSD (Ozer et al., 
2003). In others, the trauma itself seems to breed chronic dissociative symptoms. A history of 
childhood trauma in particular, has been researched to be prevalent among adults who dissociate 
(Dancu, Riggs, Heart-Ikeda, Shoyer, & Foa, 1996). As of yet, the available evidence indicates 
that research is still needed to delineate the specific roles of all potential factors that may account 
for the association between dissociation and trauma pathology – including pre, peri, and post-
traumatic links. Much like the term “trauma,” dissociation has come to mean too many things 
and the construct suffers from over-use.  
Dissociation subscales and Defense Use 
An unarticulated aim of this study has been to contribute to a better conceptual 
understanding of some aspect of dissociation - is it a process, organization, psychological 
 76 
defense, or symptom? It is clear that dissociative phenomena is intimately tied to trauma 
experiences. Might it be possible then to consider that the present study’s finding of high 
projection use and low arousal, and high identification use and high arousal, are manifestations 
of some aspects of dissociation? Post-hoc analyses were employed to investigate this question, 
revealing significant correlations with some aspects of dissociation. Individuals with early onset 
of potentially traumatic events who relied on projection on low arousal cards, endorsed higher 
Derealization scores. Individuals with early onset who used proportionally more identification 
overall endorsed lower Memory Disturbance scores.    
Might this support the idea that particular psychological defenses may support the 
adaptive or maladaptive use of varying forms of dissociation? Holmes et al. (2005) has evaluated 
the differentiation of two qualitatively separate types of dissociation:  detachment and 
compartmentalization. They specified Derealization as an example of detachment, and Memory 
Disturbance as a form of compartmentalization. Detachment is considered to reflect experiences 
of disconnection from self and others while compartmentalization portrays disturbances in the 
capacity to manage and experience certain internal processes of emotion, thought, and memory. 
The former is an externalizing phenomenon, the latter a more internalized conflict. These 
conceptualizations help to more closely target therapeutic interventions.   
 
Case Studies 
Drawing from the rich data of the TAT, 4 individual case studies will be discussed to 
expand upon the main group findings. A qualitative analysis can further highlight the 
complexities of individual difference, amidst the group effects. The following 4 participants were 
chosen because their profiles approximate the study’s main findings. All 4 participants endorsed 
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early exposure to potentially traumatic events. 2 relied on using the defense of projection and 
indicated a low arousal profile. Another 2 participants tended to rely on identification and 
demonstrated high physiological arousal. A closer examination of their narratives helps bring to 
life the nature of their anxieties, their main defenses against identified conflicts and fears, and 
ways in which they attempt to reconcile them. This data enriches the study’s main findings by 
adding clinical relevance. These qualitative analyses can be juxtaposed with a visual 
representation of their physiological profiles as represented in Figure 4.  
 
High Projection Users 
Case of “Paula”:  Early exposure to potentially traumatic events 
Paula is a 23 year old Black female who endorsed childhood sexual trauma at age 9. She met 
criteria for PTSD.  
Card 1, the first to be administered, depicts a young boy contemplating a violin that rests on a 
table in front of him. Paula’s responses are longer than most in the sample, running 
approximately 24 minutes. Of note, her language throughout the task includes repetitions of 
words, phrases, and ideas: 
(Card 1) Well this little boy he looks as if he’s confused or he’s just sad about not 
being able to play the violin as I can see. Or he’s been let down by a parent or has 
been told he’s been disappointed in. And he feels as if he can’t accomplish certain 
things so therefore he just put his instrument down and just looks at it as an 
obstacle he can’t overcome. He, he wants more in life even though he’s just a 
child he feels as if he shouldn’t be treated the way he is being treated or he 
shouldn’t be told certain things the way he’s told. Because I know that kids they 
usually feel as if when you’re told the harshest of truths it really affects them so. 
He just looks, he’s really, really let down and he doesn’t know how to feel at that 
point, at that given time. What may be happening next would be him giving up 
completely playing the instrument probably be more serious in his work or in his 
studies. But truly his passion lies within the instrument, you can see that. He 
expects more in life but I feel like if he were to get older, he probably would try to 
repress his passion for certain things and just go full fledge into the work field and 
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try to forget about it. But even that you could see within his work he wouldn’t be 
happy. He looks like he’s bored with work ‘cause there’s a book under the violin 
and he looks like he doesn’t want to do anything pertaining to work. He rather just 
play the instrument himself. That’s it. 
 
Striking in Paula’s narrative is a lack of an organizing temporal glue. Though Paula generates 
many words and offers a succession of hypothetical themes, it’s difficult to understand where the  
story is going. Paula’s attempt to deal with the ambiguity of the card produces an abundance of 
defensive reactions. Most prominently, she projects negative attributions onto the adult figures 
and the child in the card is left confused, let down, and helpless. There is an emergent feeling of 
disorganized attachment in the way the child relates to his predicament. The anxiety produced by 
this first card causes Paula to grasp rather ineffectively at all her defenses.  
With the 4th card, Paula’s use of projection is more fully prominent. While there 
continues to be an ineffective temporal integration of the story, Paula begins to project 
threatening, aggressive, hostile impulses with abandon and her narrative does convey a sense of 
discharging all the rising, negative affect: 
 
(Card 8BM) Woah. Okay! Well this kid looks like he’s from the Omen. I don’t 
know who’s having surgery but it seems as if this child is losing something great 
in his life so he has to watch on and hope and pray that this person lives on to help 
him live. And he’s never seen some trauma like this in his life so now it’s like the 
crossroads where he has to wait. These doctors on this person, it seems as if it just 
happened over night like somebody broke into the house and somebody, a lot of 
people were held hostage and somebody was stabbed or injured or shot and god, 
by god’s grace there’s like two doctors in the house and they’re performing a 
surgery without no anesthesia, no anything and they’re just trying their best to 
make the best of this situation and save this person. But then again, there’s a 
shotgun pointing upward so maybe this person is being abused cause they have a 
really strange, weird face like that straight face with no emotion in their eyes so 
maybe this person is actually shot the person that was providing for them because 
they felt a certain way or they weren’t given a certain attention or a certain love 
that they see other people get like. Like there’s a coldness in this kid’s eyes and 
it’s scary like, why? There’s a dark window… there’s a person on the table you 
can see he’s in pain but this kid just has a straight face as if he’s the murderer 
himself almost. Maybe he was abused, maybe he was hurt or maybe his mother 
was hurt. Maybe somebody he was close to got hurt in such a way that this is the 
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person on the table affecting everybody and he thought maybe if I killed him, 
maybe if I shot him he’d stop. Future wise, futuristic wise maybe he becomes a 
serial killer later on in life, I don’t know. Or he becomes a person that wants to be 
part of the laws made. Maybe this is a mistake he never realized would affect so 
much, Or maybe he doesn’t care cause he felt like this was justice served. And 
these doctors they’re working effortlessly to try and save but this is only the first 
phase of the surgery as I can see. 
 
The story also includes an addition of more ominous characters – “somebody broke into 
the house” and “a lot of people were held hostage,” and multiple references to injury, assault, 
entrapment, and cruelty abound. Paula’s ability to integrate the characters in the story is 
compromised also by the fact that she frequently performs a reversal of roles. Cramer defines 
this defensive maneuver in the denial category, when characters take on qualities previously 
stated conversely in the story. Paula does this often – the protagonist is the abuser, then becomes 
the abused, then returns to becoming a serial killer in the future. It seems that the reversals serve 
the purpose of covering all potentially threatening possibilities – as if the organizing principle is 
to name all the sources of potential danger.  
Paula’s response to the next card is especially revealing because it is a low arousal card 
with one of the more neutral images in the series. A young woman is sitting in a chair with her 
chin in her hand, looking off in to the distance. Paula’s high generation of aggressive and hostile 
projections is readily apparent: 
(Card 8GF) This woman looks as if she’s daydreaming. She looks like she’s been 
working really, really hard cause her hands are kind of, her sleeves are up. So 
maybe she’s a maid. And she wishes to be rich one day and to fall in love one 
day. Maybe she wishes for the man of her dreams to come through the door where 
she’s in love with this person that she’s cleaning for. She sees all the things 
around him going awry or maybe he’s a single father or a single rich man.  I don’t 
know, with children. And she wants to be the mother at that point. Or maybe she 
sees this rich man and his wife fall in love and she’s jealous. She could be jealous 
and thinking of ways to get rid of this extra person that’s in her way. So that she 
gets what she wants. Or maybe she’s just thinking overall like how she’s going to 
provide for her family. Cause she’s just daydreaming for the most part. She 
doesn’t have a rough face. She looks like she’s just zoned out. Maybe she’s in a 
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corner of a house. She finds her own little corner like after she stops working for a 
little bit, takes a rest, and  she just started daydreaming about what she could have 
done in the future, what she could have done in her past and be her future. Um 
certain answers and certain decisions she made, she could’ve made better and 
now she realizes that she had no choice. Or maybe she’s a single mom with a lot 
of kids and the man is probably beating her cause it looks like she’s a little 
bruised here on top of her eye a little bit. So she said this is her only escape I 
guess, out of the household. She’s cleaning somebody else’s house and she’s 
away from her husband, she’s away from her kids. But she probably worries 
about her kids thinking that her husband can do the worst possible things to them. 
But! yet again she has to make a living. Futuristic wise, she said she’s going to get 
herself out of certain situations but she still remains because there’s the roof over 
her head, over her children’s head. Her husband is probably still going to remain 
her husband because she loves him and she knows him before all the abuse. Or 
she sees the family that she wants or  - and she wants it for herself too but then 
again she’s not as strong as other woman may be. So she decides she’ll stay, hope 
to get a little more money and get her kids out of whatever situation she’s going 
through. That’s it. 
 
The protagonist begins with an idealizing wish to fall in love. Quickly this devolves, once 
“she sees all the things around him going awry,” and her defensive reactions are unleashed, as if 
her flight into fantasy was intolerable. Themes of jealousy, threat, uncertainty, mistrust and 
abuse are imbued into the story but the underlying affects are not confronted. The clear sense of 
threat, that something will go awry, is dealt with by shifting attention to another, possibly more 
heinous event. Paula’s reference to the figure’s “bruised here on top of her eye a little bit,” is a 
striking comment, generating the plotline of abuse.  
 
 
Case of “Pam”: Late exposure to potentially traumatic events 
Pam is a 50 year old Hispanic female who endorsed her first sexual assault at age 46. She 
met criteria for PTSD. 
(Card 1) Oh, wow. It looks like he’s a kid who’s been sexually abused and he 
doesn’t know what to do. Um, he trusted his violin instructor and he’s at home 
right now and he doesn’t want to go to violin practice and he’s not telling… Like 
his mother’s saying “You have to go! You have to go! You have to go!” and he 
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doesn’t want to go, but he doesn’t know what to do about it. (And what’s going to 
happen?) He’ll get raped. He’s going to get molested. 
 
Pam’s response is a good example of an evident mismatch between the common themes 
typically pulled for by this low arousal card and Pam’s interpretation of the boy’s situation. If the 
TAT is a task that tests for the “mastery of morbid affects” through the use of narrative (Tuber, 
2012), Pam’s response calls into question her basic reality testing. She projects an inordinate 
degree of threat experienced by the boy, as well as an added, abusive violin teacher. The boy’s 
mother too, is mis-attuned, hostile, and can’t be trusted as someone the boy might turn to for 
safety. In contrast to a Pollyanna-ish story that ends with a superficial ending, this one completes 
with determined danger. Nonetheless, the effect of Pam’s degree of apprehension for threat 
based on this card may indicate her great need to expel the hostile affects she experiences 
everywhere.  
Pam’s responses are also striking for the ways in which she intrudes upon the storytelling 
task by inserting her own, first-person subject. On Card 3BM, and then a few times throughout 
the task, she uses the pronoun “I,” breaking the frame of the task. 
(Card 3BM) Battered and abused. Yeah, this is, this is like someone, you know, I 
don’t know, I can’t tell if it’s a woman? Yeah, probably a woman, who’s feeling 
like I do. You know, drained, don’t know what to do, where to go, who to talk to. 
Physically abused, mentally abused. And, um, just in pain. Just don’t know what 
to do. Just in a hole. What led to that could be through no fault of her own. Just a 
bad decision. Even the best decisions can get you in situations like this woman 
here.  
 
Pam shows her limited ability to create a narrative with temporal parts. She aligns herself with 
the character’s affective state and then has difficulty moving beyond it. The character, and Pam 
for matter, is stuck with her own bad decision. There is no elaboration beyond the perception of 
her battered experience. By the end, it is as if Pam is describing herself, providing a view into the 
egocentric quality of Pam’s limited object relational world.  
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High Identification Users 
 
Case of “Isaac”: Early exposure to potentially traumatic events 
Isaac is a 35 year old male, identified as “other,” who experienced sexual assault at 10 years old. 
He met Criterion A only, and does not carry a PTSD diagnosis. 
(Card 1) So this is a story of a little boy who plays violin. One day he was playing 
his violin and one of his strings broke and so he had no strings and he was 
wondering how to fix it. So he sat down on the table and put his hands on his head 
and was thinking about how he can fix the violin so he can play it again. (What’s 
going to happen?) And he realized that he doesn’t really have the money for it 
himself so he’s thinking that eventually when his grandpa comes home, his 
grandpa will take him out and help him get the violin restrung. (What is he 
thinking and what is he feeling?) So he’s thinking how that, long that will take to 
get it fixed and, and he’s frustrated because he had to practice and wasn’t able to 
do. He wants to make music. 
 
Isaac demonstrates a seamless integration of conflict, resolve, and temporality in his narrative. 
There is some paucity of affect – the little boy thinks his way through the situation initially until 
Isaac is prompted to answer about what he might also be feeling. There is also identification with 
a benevolent, older figure who will aid the boy and support his ambition to make music.  
As the task progresses, the conflict of indecision becomes a predominant theme throughout 
Isaac’s responses, and actually appears on nearly every card after Card 1: 
(Card 3BM) So this is a story about a young adolescent that…. is tired, and has a 
lot of emotion I think. And sat down one day just to have some quiet time, by I 
guess himself, and needed some quiet time to just collect his thoughts away from 
the parents, and….. (So what’s going to happen and what is he thinking and 
feeling?) I think that he came there because he was tired and needed to rest and 
collect his thoughts in solitude and, eventually he’ll  get up and have to face the 
rest of his day. And I think, he’s thinking about some of the different decisions 
that he’s had to make. And he’s felt a bit indecisive about them, and…maybe 
perplexed because he doesn’t know how to make the right decision, or decision 
that he feels comfortable with. But he wants to do his best so after the quiet time, 
he will have to make the decision that he thought about. 
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Unlike Card 1, Isaac’s protagonist in this card identifies parental figures who he needs to 
separate from. Though he begins the response with reference to affect – “lot of emotion,” there is 
little elaboration beyond this. In fact, Isaac returns to a conflict of right versus wrong through a 
decision he needs to make.  
(Card 8GF) This is a story about a woman, who’s an artist and lives alone, and is 
having a cup of tea, and is waiting, thinking, contemplating, some of their work. 
And she’s been living alone for a while and is thinking about moving to another 
place, maybe to another location in the world; is thinking about if this is the right 
space for her, in the city. Or if these people she’s meeting, are the right people 
that she’s meeting. (What’s going to happen next?) She’s going to make a 
decision, whether not to do that, whether not to move, and she… she’s trying hard 
because of the financial situation she’s in. (What is she feeling?) She’s feeling a 
lot of emotions. Like she wants to stay, she wants to go, and she’s feeling 
inhibited somewhat. 
 
Case of “Ivan” : Late exposure to potentially traumatic events 
Ivan is a 29 year old Black male, who experienced combat in a war zone at age 19. He met 
criteria for PTSD. 
(Card 1)  He’s upset because his violin broke and he really wants to play it. It’s 
frustrating him and he wants to throw it on the floor and break it. He’s bored and 
he, um, he doesn’t know what to do with himself. You want me to keep on going? 
(What’s going to happen?) He’s going to find a way to try to fix it, but it’s not 
going to work, so he’s going to end up eventually breaking it.  
 
Readily apparent in Ivan’s response is the confounded and constricted sense of time. The boy is 
upset in the present because the violin is broken, yet he wants also to break it himself, and in the 
future, he’ll still “end up eventually breaking it.” His sense of the future is restricted and 
hopeless, as if he is telling a story with no possibility for a new ending. It ends just as it begins, 
with no hope for a reparative or agentive future. Also evident is the easily accessed aggressive 
impulse – “he wants to throw it on the floor and break it,” that Ivan quickly departs from by 
stating immediately after that the boy is “bored.” Ivan undoes the aggression by reverting to a 
state of unknowing, evidenced  further by his own direct questioning to the administrator about 
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the task. In identifying with the frustration, there is a sense of hopeless destruction. Ivan shows 
very little affective flexibility. There are few choices about how to feel about this situation.   
In the next few responses, an interesting shift occurs around managing the aggressive impulse 
Ivan identified with above. In Card 2 and Card 3BM, Ivan’s protagonists get punished for doing 
things they’d like to do: 
(Card 2) She just got out of school. She doesn’t want to go straight home.  She 
wants to stay out and gaze upon the hills and watch the farmers plow the land. 
She’s going to get in trouble when she gets home because she was supposed to go 
straight home from school and she didn’t listen.  
 
(Card 3BM) She’s real tired. She went out last night, to hang out with some 
friends. And now she has to go to work in the morning. But she can’t get out of 
her bed, so she decided to kneel down and put her head on the bed. She will be 
running late. She’s going to get written up for it. Anything else?  
 
There are several striking things to note in Ivan’s responses. For one, there is some improvement 
in temporal breadth, in contrast to the circularity of time in Card 1. However, both cards have a 
very similar arc whereby the protagonist will “get in trouble,” and pay consequences for doing 
what she prefers. For both responses, there is a clear presence of a powerful, externalized 
authority. Ivan reveals how rigid his internalized prohibitions are, limiting his ability to imagine 
any other outcome other than reproach. In Card 3BM, Ivan completely omits mention of the 
object commonly seen as the gun, further indicating how his aggression, readily seen in Card 1, 
turns latent. Instead, he effectively aligns it with a harsh superego that becomes the main 
organizing force of his stories, indeed contributing to a less constricted narrative than his first 
response, albeit still limited in its affective range.  
By Card 8BM, Ivan reveals his range of functioning, evidencing his ability to integrate 
the characters quickly into relationships that make sense of the complex scene.  
(Card 8BM) This one, um, seems like a bystander, is in the medical facility and 
like he wants to look at the operation but he really doesn’t so he’s staring away. 
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But it’s hard for him, and it’s making him sad because he can’t really look at what 
they’re doing to the guy on the table. (What led up to it, what’s going to happen?)  
Hm. He’s an intern, and the guy on the table got a gunshot wound. And what’s 
going to happen is he will eventually turn around and watch and try to take the 
bullet from his side.  
 
He does not completely shy away from the aggression here, incorporating it as a “gunshot 
wound.” Furthermore, he turns his “bystander,” into an “intern,” who, despite not wanting to 
look, takes action in the end to “take the bullet.” Ivan also reveals more about his conflicts – “he 
wants to,” “he really doesn’t,” and “it’s hard,” “it’s making him sad because he can’t really 
look.” Ivan reveals identifications with various parts of himself – as a passive bystander, a timid 
intern, and then a brave hero, and his conflicts around reconciling these possibilities breaks 
through. Ivan’s protagonist also struggles with his own desire, fear, and sadness, and eventually 
can “take the bullet” but offers no explanation for how or why. 
Ivan’s progression through the task reveals a range of his defensive operations; how his 
superego contains his aggression, can organize his thoughts under pressure, but also how it limits 
his overall emotional range. Ivan does demonstrate his reliance on identification to regulate 
destructive impulses.   
Figure 4 depicts a snapshot of the physiological profiles of the 4 cases previously 
illustrated. The overall higher and increasing physiological profiles of high identification users 
Isaac and Ivan, stand in contrast to the markedly lower physiological profiles of high projection 
users, Paula and Pam. Their length of narrative responses and time of physiological responding 
in these 4 cases also demonstrates a broad range. The figure reveals an overall flattening effect 
from high projection users, and activated responsiveness from high identification users. While 
there is some overlap of themes across the 4 cases, the sense of temporal constriction and limited 
integration of other characters is prevalent in high projection users. Fending off the negative 
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affects seemed to be a primary goal. In contrast, high identifications users explicitly struggled to 
integrate their object relational world, grappling with indecision and somewhat more cognitively 
complex tasks.  
This graphic depiction of individual cases can only be cautiously viewed in light of this 
study’s main findings but provides another window into the relationship between defense use 
and physiological response.
  
Figure 4 
Physiological Profiles of Case Studies: High Projection & High Identification Users with Early and Late Onset of PTEs 
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Clinical Implications of the Current Findings 
 
The results of this study demonstrate that an individual’s response to trauma is multi-
determined and complex. The study gives empirical evidence as to how the onset of potentially 
traumatic events play a role in how psychological defenses impact the body’s autonomic 
reactivity. This study builds upon prior research that investigates the subset of re-experiencing 
and hyperarousal symptoms so common to traumatized populations, providing evidence that 
situation-specific variables must be taken into account. For example, hypervigilance may not 
equate to physiological arousal, and the relationship between the two are impacted by individual 
differences including defense use and personality structure. 
Importantly, the study provides evidence that patients who dissociate characterologically 
may be qualitatively different than adults who use a form of repression as an effective coping 
strategy. In treatment, clinicians must seriously consider that it may not always be important to 
“uncover” early traumas. Rather, a thorough assessment and close attention to how an individual 
uses their defense of choice as an effective coping strategy is of utmost importance. This will 
provide clinicians with a strength-based perspective to work with and ultimately improve 
treatment when amplifying ways to work with a patient’s defenses.  
Given the complex relationship between defense use and physiology, working with 
trauma populations would warrant careful attention to patients’ often variable, subjective 
experiences of stress, their own active/passive coping strategies, and baseline physiological 
assessments as part of the therapeutic process. Using neuro or biofeedback techniques to help 
patients themselves understand, and realize their own stress response may be empowering to 
allow them to “see” change in their own bodies. This may be one way to incorporate the patient’s 
body in a safe and controlled way in the therapeutic relationship. 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The results of this study carry implications for clinicians and researchers working with 
traumatized populations, but there are a number of shortcomings of the design and execution that 
limit conclusions. First, the study was ultimately exploratory in nature and thus tested hypotheses 
that were purposefully broad in their specification. Although valuable for refining questions for 
further research and theory development, this approach limits the specificity of findings.  
One major weakness of the study is its sample size of 43, with group sizes between 14-15 
individuals limiting the generalizability of findings. The mixed trauma sample, including those 
with interpersonal and non-interpersonal traumatic exposure, made comparisons to other studies 
that focused on childhood abuse or adult-onset trauma, more difficult. In addition, because 
chronicity of traumatic exposure is a delineating feature of complex trauma, it would be prudent 
to include a more thorough assessment of the nature and intensity of indexed traumas in future 
study designs and data analyses. 
 One major conceptual shortcoming of the study is the tendency to equate early onset 
trauma with a complex PTSD picture. Certainly, suggesting causal links in this regard runs 
counter to the aims of this study, which privileges the heterogeneity of factors contributing to 
traumatic response. Relatedly, an alternative interpretation in understanding why the early onset 
group using greater projection demonstrates decreased physiological reactivity, is to consider 
that this is a population already traumatized. In other words, perhaps their greater use of 
projection is not indicative of greater pathology, but perhaps of an altered reality. 
The use of a projective assessment such as the TAT is a strength of the study in that it 
provides a way to overcome the limitations of self-report measures. It would be particularly 
meaningful to continue using projective measures in future studies to better understand the 
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complex clinical symptom picture including unsymbolized experiences and heightened 
dissociative processes so common in this population (Arnon et al, 2011). Given the rich data that 
the TAT provides, future studies could further analyze the narratives to investigate linguistic 
characteristics and storytelling capacity. This would expand upon existing research linking 
aspects of cognitive style and dimensions of alexithymia to even better differentiate the defense 
processes that these individuals may be utilizing. 
While the DMM is well-validated through repeated use, it does not capture many 
operationalizations of ego-defense, and excludes the representation of one very commonly used 
defense of repression, pervasive to trauma populations. Some of the clinical implications of 
working with patients who use repression as an effective coping strategy versus patients who 
may dissociate characterologically have been previously discussed. It is quite possible that the 
adaptive defense use captured by findings in this study may have overlap – conceptually and 
empirically – with a flexible coping style, a style that has been correlated with good prognostic 
outcomes in the literature (Mancini & Bonanno, 2006; Bonanno et al., 2004). Specifically, 
Coifman and Bonannno (2007) have attempted to measure repressive coping behavior called 
“affective-autonomic response discrepancy” (AARD), that is defined as occurring when 
individuals report relatively little negative affect during stressful tasks while simultaneously 
evidencing heightened physiological responses. Their findings include that the tendency to direct 
attention away from negative affective experience, such as repressive coping, may promote 
resilience following extremely aversive events (Coifman and Bonanno, 2007). The burgeoning 
area of research in traumatic resilience may use similar conceptual models to the one used in this 
study – a review of convergent findings would be an exciting next step. Nevertheless, future 
studies might not shy away from the challenge of finding an ecologically valid way to assess 
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repression, a mechanism that may very well underlie many other defenses and thus may provide 
a more nuanced understanding of defense mechanisms. 
The advantage of using SCR rate is that it can measure activity of the autonomic response 
system that is not always under conscious control. It provides an objective measurement of 
subjective experiences. However, there is conflicting evidence in how different systems within 
the autonomic nervous system respond differentially to psychological processes (Hughes, 
Uhlmann, & Pennebaker, 1994; Fowles, 1980; DePierro, J., D’Andrea, W., Pole, N., 2013). 
Though beyond the scope of this study, including a measure of the parasympathetic branch, 
which also corresponds to stress and cognitive engagement, would be useful. For example, lower 
heart rate and respiration rate, both measures of the parasympathetic nervous system, have been 
linked to individuals with trauma exposure (Hopper, Spinazzola, Simpson, & van der Kolk, 
2006); Sack, Hopper, & Lamprecht, 2004). Research attending to PTSD symptom clusters and 
both ANS branches (sympathetic and parasympathetic) may clarify the meaning of blunted and 
heightened physiological responses. In short, despite the compelling utility of using skin 
conductance measures as an indicator of a psychological state or process, changes in skin 
conductance and electrodermal activity do not occur in isolation. Rather, they occur as a part of 
complex set of responses mediated by the autonomic nervous system. It is crucial to determine 
the psychological meaning of any particular SCR after establishing a well-controlled stimulus 
situation. The paradigm of this study relies greatly on subjective coding and interpretation – both 
of defense use and nature of trauma. Future studies should attempt to replicate findings with 
improved participant criterion selection. 
This study has attempted to make links between unconscious defense use and 
physiological markers between individuals who have been exposed to potentially traumatic 
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events. Individuals recruited in this study were already exposed to PTEs. They were considered 
vulnerable if they endorsed symptoms. The research into PTSD vulnerability factors has most 
often entailed non-biologic measures (Orr, S.P. & Roth, W.T., 2000). Future research can use 
electrodermal lability and habituation rate to investigate pre-trauma vulnerability. This research 
would expand existing findings that suggest that the conditionability of individuals impact their 
sensitization to trauma (Orr et al, 2000). These individuals may not fare as well in extinction-
based treatments. Furthermore, physiological measures should continue to be used not just as 
predictors of diagnostic picture, but as valuable information for treatment and recovery.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this exploratory study was to link psychoanalytic theories of trauma and its 
impact on the mind with psychobiological research of how trauma lives in the body. The present 
study expands on prior research (Cramer, 2003) providing evidence that defense mechanisms do 
in fact, moderate the relationship between stress and physiological response. The subjective 
interpretation of traumatic events and the psychological defenses used, start the cascade of 
psychobiological responses to trauma. The present study attempted to identify the psychological 
concomitants of these individual differences within a population exposed to potentially traumatic 
events, and their proclivity for using different defense mechanisms. There is evidence to support 
that there may be distinct dissociative processes that differentiate the use of projection and 
identification. 
In short, this study supports the notion that early exposure to trauma does not give one a 
fixed identity. PTSD is a living diagnosis, with responses that are infinitely complex, based on 
 93 
individual differences and vulnerabilities. Post-traumatic responses must be understood from a 
developmental psychopathology framework, supporting the notion that potentially traumatic 
experiences in an individual’s life contribute to a loading of multi-determined factors in a 
person’s life. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
The current diagnostic criteria for DESNOS is listed here: (Luxenberg, Spinazzola, & van der 
Kolk, 2001) 
 
I.  Alteration in Regulation of Affect and Impulses (A and 1 of B-F required): 
 A.  Affect Regulation  
 B.  Modulation of Anger  
 C.  Self-Destructive 
 D.  Suicidal Preoccupation 
 E.  Difficulty Modulating Sexual Involvement 
 F.  Impulsive & Excessive Risk-taking 
II.  Alterations in Attention or Consciousness (A or B required): 
 A.  Amnesia 
 B.  Transient Dissociative Episodes and Depersonalization 
III.  Alterations in Self-Perception (2 of A-F required): 
 A.  Ineffectiveness 
 B.  Permanent Damage 
 C.  Guilt and Responsibility 
 D.  Shame 
 E.  Nobody Can Understand 
 F.  Minimizing 
IV.  Alterations in Relations With Others (1 of A-C required): 
 A.  Inability to Trust 
 B.  Revictimization 
 C.  Victimizing Others 
V.  Somatization (2 of A-E required): 
 A.  Digestive System 
 B.  Chronic Pain 
 C.  Cardiopulmonary Symptoms 
 D.  Conversion Symptoms 
 E.  Sexual Symptoms 
VI.  Alterations in Systems of Meaning (A or B required): 
 A.  Despair and Hopelessness 
 B.  Loss of Previously Sustaining Beliefs 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Summary of Defense Mechanism Manual Scoring Categories (Cramer, 2006) 
 
DENIAL:  
1. Omission 
2. Misperception 
3. Reversal 
4. Statements of Negation 
5. Denial of Reality 
6. Overly Maximizing Positive, Minimizing Negative 
7. Unexpected Goodness, Optimism, Positiveness, Gentleness 
 
 
PROJECTION 
1. Attribution of Aggressive or Hostile Feeling, Emotions, or Intentions to a Character, or Other 
Feelings, Emotions, or Intentions that are Normatively Unusual. 
2. Additions of Ominous People, Ghosts, Animals, Objects or Qualities. 
3. Magical or Circumstantial Thinking 
4. Concern for Protection from External Threat 
5. Apprehensiveness of Death, Injury, or Assault 
6. Themes of Pursuit, Entrapment, and Escape 
7. Bizarre or Very Unusual Story or Theme 
 
 
IDENTIFICATION    
1. Emulation of Skills 
2. Emulation of Characteristics 
3. Regulation of Motives or Behavior 
4. Self-esteem through Affiliation 
5. Work: Delay of Gratification 
6. Role Differentiation 
7. Moralism 
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